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THE AGROECOLOGICAL MYTHOLOGY OF THE JAVANESE 
AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INDONESIA*
Michael R. Dove
I. Introduction
Indonesia is a country known both for the magnitude of efforts directed 
towards the development of its agriculture, and for the apparently problematic 
results of many of these efforts. Some of the problems reflect the real diffi­
culties of successfully articulating land, people, and work in a developing 
country; but others, as I will argue in this article, result from discontinuities 
between the empirical agricultural reality that must be addressed in development 
and the perceptions of those officials and planners who direct it. The basic 
discontinuity involves the contrast between the agricultural ecologies of 
inner and outer Indonesia, and the evaluation of this contrast by the preeminent 
culture of inner Indonesia, the Javanese. This is a contrast between irrigated 
rice cultivation in Java (and also Bali and Lombok), and the swidden cultivation 
of dry rice in Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and the lesser Sunda islands.1 
Contemporary Javanese (speaking here of those in decision-making positions) 
uniformly speak of the former agricultural system as more productive, more 
rational, and in general better for the nation and national development than 
the latter. The swidden-based system of agriculture is regarded not merely 
as less good than the system of irrigated rice cultivation, but explicitly 
as something bad— irrational, destructive, and uncontrollable. It is the 
thesis of this article that this comparative evaluation of wet-rice and dry-rice 
agriculture is fundamentally distorted, and that the reasons for this are 
not pedagogical, but rather economic and political. My thesis is that the 
Javanese idealization of intensive rice cultivation and deprecation of extensive 
rice cultivation is based on a cultural myth, one important consequence of 
which is to rationalize and sustain the political and economic preeminence 
of their culture and government.
* This analysis was carried out while the author worked at the East-West Environ­
ment and Policy Institute and at Gadjah Mada University's Environmental Studies 
Center. The work was variously supported by CRIS (Stanford University), EAPI 
(East-West Center), FAO/UNFPD, the Ford Foundation, the National Science Foundation 
(grant no. GS-42605), and the Rockefeller Foundation. Earlier versions of this 
article were presented at the CCSEAS-ISEAS Joint International Conference on 
Village-Level Modernization, Singapore, June 21-24, 1982; at the 81st Annual 
Meeting of the American Anthropological Association, Washington, D.C., Decem­
ber 4-7, 1982; and at the Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, December 
9, 1982. The author is indebted for many helpful comments and criticisms to 
Carol Carpenter, John Duewel, Colin MacAndrews, Donald Nonini, and Christine 
Padoch. The author alone, however, is responsible for the analysis herein 
presented.
1. See C lifford  Geertz, Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological 
Change in Indonesia (Berkeleys University of California Press, 1963), pp. 13-15.
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2I will begin my presentation of this thesis with a summary of relevant aspects 
of contemporary government land-use policy in Indonesia—as this relates to forest 
fallow swidden agriculture—and the problems to which this policy leads. I will 
then try to explain the source of these problems by analyzing the discontinuity 
between the official view and the reality of irrigated agriculture and swidden 
agriculture in Indonesia. I will trace the origins of this discontinuity to the 
agroecological expediencies of the great, irrigation-based kingdoms of Java, and 
then trace it through the colonial era and back into contemporary times. Through­
out I shall maintain that intensive wet-rice cultivation, because it is a function 
of high population density and maximizes returns to land and capital, is suited 
to the extraction of part of the agricultural product by a central government; 
whereas extensive dry-rice cultivation is not so suited, since it is a function 
of low population density and maximizes returns to labor or people.
II. Contemporary Government Policy on Swidden Agriculture
The Indonesian government’ s attitude with regard to irrigated versus swidden 
agriculture is most easily seen in its various policies on the use of the Outer 
Island^ forests. Based on the government's tendency to view all forested lands 
as tanah negara, "federal lands," these policies emphasize that such lands should 
be managed (under the aegis of the national ministry of forestry) for export- 
oriented timber production and, to a lesser extent, for protection of watersheds, 
conservation of nature, and for the socioeconomic development of the local 
peoples. * In the eyes of the government, arguably the one factor most inimical 
to the attainment of these goals is the practice of swidden agriculture, which 
is the dominant system of agriculture in Indonesia's Outer Islands in terms 
of both the amount of land and number of people involved.
The government's criticism of swidden agriculture covers a gamut of concerns, 
involving its effects not only on the environment in which it is practiced but 
also on the people who carry it out. The government speaks unfavorably of the 
swidden cultivators as still living secara berpindah-pindah dan terpencar-pencar, 
"in a nomadic and scattered manner." It regards them as terasing "the most 
foreign" and terbelakang "the most backward,"* and their system of agriculture 
as technologically poor and intellectually unprepossessing.2 34 5 Indeed, there is 
even some suggestion that swidden cultivation does not represent a system of 
agriculture at all. * Consonant with this, the government maintains that the
2. Republik Indonesia, Garis-Garis Besar Haitian Negara Republik Indonesia 
1983-1988 (Surabaya: Sinar Wijaya, 1983), pp. 41-42, 55.
3. Ibid., pp. 37, 55, 68.
4. Ombo Satjapradja et al., eds., Proceedings Seminar Agroforestry Dan Pengen- 
dalian Perladangan, Jakarta, November 19-21, 1981 (Jakarta: Direktorat Reboasasi 
dan Rehabilitasi, dan Direktorat Jenderal Kehutanan, 1981), pp. 5, 19, 25, 632. 
This view of traditional tribal peoples is neither necessary nor universal. 
Whereas the Indonesian government labels its tribal peoples Suku Terasing 
"Most Isolated, or Most Foreign, Tribes," neighboring Malaysia uses the term 
Orang Asli "Indigenous Peoples," which has very different connotations.
5. Common skepticism over the agricultural status of swidden agriculture 
is reflected  in the fact that one high government official fe lt obliged to 
assert, of its practitioners, nPada dasarnyat mereka adalah petani juga,n 
"Basically, they are farmers too." Ibid., p. 10.
3swidden cultivators live at the lowest levels of subsistence but, nonetheless, 
cling to this system of agriculture solely because of the strength of their 
culture. The government speaks of the waste of the system in terms not only of 
its avowedly low agricultural returns, but also of the potentially profitable, 
alternative exploitation of the forest for commercial timber production. The 
government also holds swidden agriculture—through the unintended consequences 
of swidden fires—to be primarily responsible for the spread of grasslands in 
Indonesia, which, together with savanna-like areas, today cover approximately 
one-third of the total land area in outer Indonesia. The government views these 
grasslands, especially those consisting of Imperata cylindrica (L.) Beauv. as 
a permanent and economically useless vegetative succession. In addition, it 
associates both this grassland succession and the swiddens themselves with 
erosion of the topsoil, silting, flooding, and seasonal droughts.*
The foregoing remains the predominant view of swidden agriculture in Indonesian 
governmental and academic circles, but in recent years a more informed point of 
view has arisen in some quarters. This acknowledges, minimally, that in some cases 
swidden agriculture does not destructively alter the environment but is rather 
in harmony with it . 6 7 89 Even here, however, swidden agriculture is still viewed 
as problematic, because it cannot absorb future increases in population without 
shortening the ratio of fallow to cultivation time, which will then precipitate 
destructive environmental successions. Because of such future problems, according 
to this view, the current practice of swidden agriculture must be curtailed.
The o ffic ia l perception of swidden agriculture and its practitioners is 
associated with, and used to justify, a number of government programs. First, 
there is a general effort both to proscribe swidden agriculture (and the charac­
teristic way of life  of its practitioners) and to prescribe for its practitioners, 
a more sedentary, intensive system of cultivation. • The government pursues 
its efforts with the greatest urgency in the forested lands in which it is 
primarily interested, such as those lying upstream from hydroelectric projects, 
or those situated in or near commercial logging concessions. In many such cases, 
the government removes the swidden agriculturalists from the critical area and 
resettles them in less isolated, less extensive territories; with the rationale 
that such relocation facilitates both their administration and their provision 
with services, such as schools, health clinics, and agricultural extension. 
This form of resettlement is an explicit feature of the current five-year 
development plan. * All of these programs are associated with some alternative
6. Ibid., pp. 5, 10, 15, 22, 24, 632; E. S. Suryatna and J. L. McIntosh, 
"Food Crops Production and Control of Imperata Cylindrica (L.) Beauv. on Small 
Farms," in Proceedings of Biotrop Workshop on Along-Along, Bogor, July 27-29, 
1976 (Bogor: Biotrop, 1980), p. 135; cf. Ruth Daroesman, "Vegetative Elimination 
of Alang-Alang," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 17, 1 (1981): 83.
7. Ombo, Proceedings, pp. 17, 20.
8. Ibid., pp. 6, 632; and Republik Indonesia, Garis-Garis Besar, p. 42.
9. Republik Indonesia, Garis-Garis Besar, pp. 37, 55. Most of these relocations 
are carried out by the Resetelmen Penduduk "Population Resettlement" program for 
indigenous peoples. But the same results—namely the resettlement of the swidden 
cultivators and the intensification of their system of agriculture—are attained 
by the Transmigrasi Sisipan "Inserted Transmigration" program (which allocates 
up to 10 percent of the places in transmigration sites to local inhabitants) 
and by some of the development schemes of the government plantations groups.
4use of the swidden agriculturalists' erstwhile territory, whether this is 
merely watershed management or, more commonly, utilization of the land for 
commercial forestry, export-crop production, intensive food-crop production, 
and/or transmigrant settlement. In areas where the forest has succeeded to 
grasslands, the government often attempts to reforest the land.
Most of these government programs, those involving the swidden lands as well 
as those directed at the swidden agriculturalists, have fallen short of fulfilling 
the stated expectations of the government, much less the expectations of the 
swidden cultivators themselves. Official proscriptions against felling forests 
for swiddens are routinely violated throughout Indonesia (with the partial 
exception of primary forests, where the proscription is either more easily 
enforced or else more readily accepted). Where this proscription is accompanied 
by resettlement, it is not uncommon for the new settlements to be abandoned after 
a year or two, the swidden cultivators fleeing back to their forest homes and 
farms as soon as official attention wanes and/or as soon as government subsidies 
cease. In the case of the development of sites for transmigration and/or 
plantations, difficulties frequently arise from the land claims of local swidden 
cultivators. Finally, the government's reforestation efforts in grassland 
areas are often less than successful, due either to lack of participation by 
the local cultivators or, more commonly, to their active opposition to such 
efforts . In ligh t of both the breadth and depth of difficulties attendant 
upon developmental programs involving swidden agriculturalists and/or their 
territories, I suggest that there is a fundamental and pervasive difference 
between the government's view of these lands and people and the cultivators' 
own view of themselves and their lands.
III. The Reality of Swidden Agriculture and Irrigated Agriculture
1. Economics
Perhaps the most critical difference between the government's view of 
swidden cultivation and the view of the cultivators themselves concerns the 
productivity of this system of agriculture. As stated earlier, the accepted 
wisdom in government and academia (not only in Indonesia but in most of the 
tropical world as well) is that the productivity of swidden agriculture is very 
low, it provides its practitioners with a very poor livelihood, and consequently 
its persistence is due not to economic factors but to reasons of tradition 
and ignorance.10 The rare attempts to buttress this view with empirical evidence 
uniformly rely on a comparison between yields per unit of area in swiddens 
and in irrigated fields.11 Although some authors have pointed out that the
10. See Michael R. Dove, "Theories of Swidden Agriculture, and the Political 
Economy of Ignorance," Agroforestry Systems 1 (1983): 85-99. The view that 
the persistence of swidden agriculture is due to particular environmental 
constraints is not unknown in Indonesia (see Ombo, Proceedings, pp. 18, 20), 
but it is still very much a minority viewpoint.
11. While I use the term "irrigation" to describe the cultivation of wet rice 
in Indonesia, it is technically more accurate to call this—especially in Java 
from where my wet-rice examples are drawn—-"water control" (Joseph E. Spencer, 
"Water Control in Terrace Rice-Field Agriculture in Southeastern Asia," in 
Irriga tion 's Impact on Society, ed. Theodore G. Downing and McGuire Gibson
5former may surpass the la tte r,12 3 this is usually not the case, at least not in 
Indonesia. A typical, smallholder’ s wet-rice field in Central Java yields 2.75 
tons of (unmilled) grain per hectare per harvest;1* whereas in the system of 
swidden agriculture that I studied among the tribal Kantu’ of West Kalimantan, 
a rice harvest of just 3/4 ton/hectare is average in swiddens cut from secondary 
forest.14 156 These swiddens also yield a harvest of nonrice cultigens, in volume 
perhaps one-half as great as the rice harvest itself, but even the sum of the 
two harvests is still equal to less than one-half of the wet-rice harvest. Since 
the swidden harvest can be taken from the same land perhaps only once every 
ten years, whereas the wet rice can be harvested from the same land two times 
(or more) every year, the difference in the productivity of the land under 
the two systems of cultivation is on the order of almost fifty-to-one.
This comparison of irrigated and swidden systems of rice cultivation is 
dramatic, and it explains why central governments prefer the former, but it does 
not at all explain why swidden farmers prefer the latter. This is because it 
measures productivity in terms of the major constraining factor in wet-rice 
cultivation— land—and not the major constraining factor in swidden cultivation- 
labor. Extensive agriculturalists tend to compare alternative systems of cultiva­
tion in terms of the return on their labor, which is scarce, as opposed to the 
return on their land, which is not scarce. A comparison of the two systems of 
cultivation in terms of returns on labor, rather than returns on land, yields a 
quite different result. In the case of the irrigated rice fields in Central Java 
cited earlier, an average of 412 workdays of household labor, plus additional wage 
labor and capital inputs (e.g., fertilizers, pesticides), are expended in the 
production of that 2.75-ton harvest, to yield a net return on household labor of 
4.2 kilograms of unmilled rice per workday. xt This is the return on labor in 
the cases in which the laborers own the land that they work. In the case of 
one-half of the land and two-thirds of the people in Java, the land is worked by 
people other than its owners, under rental or sharecropping arrangements, and in 
these cases the return on labor drops to just 2.1 kilograms or less per workday.14
[Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1974], p. 59) and/or "inundation” 
(Brian Spooner, "Irrigation  and Society on the Iranian Plateau," in ibid., 
p. 44).
12. Georges Condominas, "Agricultural Ecology in the Southeast Asian Savanna 
Region: The Muang Gar of Vietnam and Their Social Space," in Human Ecology in 
Savanna Environments, ed. David R. Harris (London: Academic Press, 1980), p. 243.
13. Benjamin N. F. White, "Production and Reproduction in a Javanese Village" 
(Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1976), p. 162.
14. Michael R. Dove, Swidden Agriculture in Indonesia: The Subsistence Strategies 
of the Kalimantan Kantu' (Berlin: Mouton, forthcoming). In making these and 
all fo llow ing calculations, all rice is measured in a threshed, winnowed, 
and unhusked state.
15. White, "Production and Reproduction," pp. 162-63. The workday in White's 
calculations is 420 minutes long (ibid., p. 157 n.). I have recalculated 
his figures based on a 350-minute workday, for ease of comparison with my 
Kantu' data.
16. Dibyo Prabowo and Affendi Anwar, "Natural Resources, Agriculture and 
the Environment," in Growth and Equity in Indonesian Agricultural Development, 
ed. Mubyarto (Jakarta: Yayasan Agro Ekonomika, 1982), p. 38; White, "Production 
and Reproduction," pp. 164-69.
6By comparison, the 3/4-ton rice harvest from the swiddens in West Kalimantan 
is the product of an average of only 95 workdays of household labor, representing 
a return of 7.9 kilograms per workday.17 189 Thus, the return on labor in the 
Kantu' swidden system ranges from 88 percent to 276 percent larger than the 
return in the Javanese irrigated rice system.
This clear d ifference in economics explains the reluctance of farmers 
to abandon a swidden system, such as this, for a more intensive system, such 
as the one described, except when forced by either population growth or government 
sanctions. It also explains the willingness of farmers to abandon intensive 
systems of cultivation for extensive systems, when this is made possible by 
depopulation or migration.1* This is not to suggest that every swidden system 
yields a higher return on labor than every irrigated system. Where particular 
local conditions make the cultivation of wet rice especially easy and the 
cultivation of swidden rice especially difficult, the former will yield higher 
gross returns to labor as well as land.17 However, even in these cases, the
17. While recognizing that swidden inputs and outputs vary from one swidden 
system to another, and that they also can vary greatly within a given swidden 
system—from one season to the next, and from one swidden subtype to another—the 
Kantu* data are presented because they appear to be not atypical of swidden 
systems in general (cf. Dove, Swidden Agriculture, pp. 378-79), and minimally 
they are valid for the system in question. These figures refer to a typical Kantu* 
swidden cut from secondary forest, which consumes an average of 168 workdays 
per hectare from the initial selection of the site to the final carrying-in 
of the rice harvest. Twenty-five of these workdays represent labor devoted 
to making the tools that are used in the course of this work. Since White 
(••Production and Reproduction," pp. 459-60) apparently le ft this expenditure 
out of his own calculations, I subtracted these twenty-five days from the 
tota l, leaving a revised total of 143 workdays/hectare. This revised total 
includes labor devoted not only to the cultivation of rice, but also to the 
wide variety of nonrice cultigens also grown in these swiddens. Accordingly, 
I further reduced the revised labor figures by a minimum of one-third to factor 
out the labor devoted to the latter, given that White's workday totals apply 
to the cultivation of rice alone. (This reduction is relatively conservative: 
in Conklin's analysis of the swidden system of the Hanuno'o of Mindoro—in 
which system rice is admittedly less important than it is in the Kantu system—he 
estimates that almost 60 percent of all swidden labor is devoted to the cultivation 
of nonrice cultigens. [Harold C. Conklin, Hanuno'o Agriculture: A Report 
on an Integral System of Shifting Cultivation in the Philippines (Rome: FAO, 
1957), p. 152.]) This last revision produces a final figure of 7.9 kilograms 
of rice per workday (= 750 kg r [143 x 2/3]).
18. Ester Boserup, The Conditions of Agricultural Growth: The Economics of 
Agrarian Change under Population Pressure (Chicago: Aldine, 1965), pp. 28, 
69} 62-63} Ronald E. Seavoy, "The Transition to Continuous Rice Cultivation 
in Kalimantan," Annals of the Association of American Geographers 63 (1973): 
225} Robert McC. Netting, "Household Organization and Intensive Agriculture: 
The Kofyar Case," Africa 35 (1965): 422-29} and idem, Hill Farmers of Nigeria: 
The Cultural Ecology of the Jos Plateau (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 1968).
19. Based on 1980 data from the Kerayan Lun Dayeh of East Kalimantan, Christine 
Padoch estimated that returns to labor averaged 7.4 kg/day in dryland swidden 
fie lds but more than 10.8 kg/day in wet-rice fields (see Christine Padoch,
7net return to the cultivator may be higher from the swidden rice. It is one 
thesis of this article that intensive agriculture not only tends to yield 
a lower return on labor than extensive agriculture, but also that it is more 
vulnerable to state extraction. This extraction can reduce the net return 
on labor in an intensive system below that of an extensive system, even in 
cases in which the gross return of the former is higher.
The higher return on labor in the swidden system is attractive because it 
allows farmers to spend less time in their swiddens than in irrigated fields, 
other things being equal. The impact of this lies not in idling the labor of 
the swidden farmers, but in freeing it for other economic pursuits. These 
pursuits may include other subsistence activities, such as hunting, fishing, and 
the gathering of wild comestibles; but typically they also include one or more 
market-oriented activities. Indonesia's swidden cultivators are heavily involved 
in the cultivation of rattan, tobacco, coffee, copra, pepper, benzoin, and rubber. 
The Kantu', for example, are rubber tappers. Having first acquired rubber 
seedlings in the 1930s, today each household owns four or five small rubber 
groves, each containing from 100 to 300 trees. This pattern of mixed subsistence 
agriculture and cash cropping is not merely common in Indonesia, it is predom­
inant. Most of the country's export crops are cultivated on a smallholder not 
plantation basis; and most of these smallholders fill their subsistence needs 
through swidden agriculture. Moreover, the historical trend over the past 
half century has been one of continual growth in this smallholder-swidden 
agriculture sector.*° For example, this sector accounts for 80 percent of the 
country’s rubber exports today, compared with 45 percent in 1938. ** This is 
impressive evidence of the relative strength and stability of this pattern 
of cash cropping, in the face of changes in the international markets, in the 
national economy and polity, and in the structure of the croppers' societies 
as well.
The success of this smallholder cultivation of export crops is directly 
related to the character of the system of swidden agriculture with which it 
is associated.** The importance of the high return on labor in this system *1520
"Agricultural Practices of the Kerayan Lun Dayeh," Borneo Research Bulletin
15, 1 [1983]: 33-38). However, the abnormality of this situation is attested
to by Padoch herself, who notes that the particular topography of the Kerayan
territory, coupled with the absence of a marked dry season and the historical
lack of iron tools, make wet-rice agriculture more practical, and swidden
agriculture less practical, than is typically the case in Kalimantan.
20. Allen M. Sievers, The Mystical World of Indonesia: Culture and Economic 
Development in Conflict (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 
pp. 193, 352-65; Karl J. Pelzer, "Swidden Cultivation in Southeast Asia: Histori­
cal, Ecological, and Economic Perspectives," in Farmers in the Forest: Economic 
Development and Marginal Agriculture in Northern Thailand, ed. Peter Kunstadter 
et al. (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1978), p. 285; Kenneth D. Thomas, "Shifting 
Cultivation and Production of Small Holder Rubber in a South Sumatran Village," 
Malayan Economic Review 10 (1965): 100-115; Ronald E. Seavoy, "Population Pressure 
and Land Use Change," Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 1 (1980): 64.
21. Ace Partadiredja, "Farm Organization, Technology and Employment," in 
Growth and Equity, ed. Mubyarto, p. 191; Seavoy, "Population Pressure," p. 10.
22. Dove, "Theories of Swidden Agriculture"; Pelzer, "Swidden Cultivation,"
p. 286.
8has already been mentioned. Equally important is the marked seasonality of 
swidden labor: among the Kantu', for example, labor inputs in the swiddens 
are limited by technoenvironmental factors to no more than 6-8 months in the 
course of one year.** Thus, the cultivation of export crops does not compete 
for labor with the swidden system so much as it serves to utilize labor that 
is otherwise underutilized. Such cash cropping addresses one of the major 
problems of extensive agricultural societies: namely, maximizing the utilization 
of available labor. Finally, the swidden system frees land for cash cropping—not 
necessarily in the sense that it is incapable of using all available land, 
but rather that it only uses it extensively, meaning infrequently. The infrequency 
of use makes the opportunity cost within the swidden system of taking land 
fo r export-crop production either low or nonexistent. It is nonexistent in 
the case of those export crops, such as coffee, tobacco, and pepper, that 
can be cultivated on fallowed swidden land between periods of food cropping; ** 
and it is low in the case of those crops, such as rubber, that can be cultivated 
only on land taken out of the swidden cycle. Among the Kantu’, the opportunity 
cost of taking one hectare of swidden land for rubber cultivation is just 
75 kilograms of rice per year (assuming that the swidden cycle consists of 
one year of cultivation, with a 3/4-ton harvest, followed by a nine-year fallow 
period). The market value of that rice is equal to as little  as 5 percent 
of the market value of one year's production from one hectare of rubber trees.
The ability of the swidden cultivators in the Outer Islands to engage in 
export-crop production is not an anomaly, therefore, but is related integrally 
to the character of their systems of swidden agriculture. It is far less charac­
teristic  of systems of intensive agriculture, such as that of the wet-rice 
cultivators of inner Indonesia. Karl Pelzer explains this as follows: "The 
swidden cultivators may be in a better position to innovate in the direction of 
cash crops than are the irrigated agriculturalists who are already trapped by a 
limited land base and a population explosion."** The low return on the labor of 
the irrigated agriculturalists necessitates the devotion of relatively large 
amounts of labor to subsistence food production. The high return on land, on the 
other hand, means that the opportunity cost of diverting any of it to other uses 
is very high. This cost is typically too high to permit even the intensive 
cultivation of export crops, so it is clearly too high to permit intermittent 
cultivation as in the Kantu* system of rubber tapping in West Kalimantan.
2. Ecology
Just as the reality of swidden economics in the Outer Islands differs 
greatly from the official view, so too does the reality of swidden ecology. 
One of the government's greatest concerns—nomadism *«— is the most easily 23456
23. Michael R. Dove, "The Myth of the Communal Longhouse in Rural Development: 
The Kantu* of Kalimantan," in Too Rapid Rural Development, ed. Colin MacAndrews 
and Lucas S. Chin (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1982); idem, "The Chayanov 
Slope in a Swidden Economy," in Chayanov, Peasants and Economic Anthropology, 
ed. E. Paul Durrenberger (New York: Academic Press, 1984), pp. 97-132; and 
idem, Swidden Agriculture in Indonesia.
24. Geertz, Agricu ltura l Involu tion , pp. 59-60, 106-11; Pelzer, "Swidden 
Cultivation."
25. Pelzer, "Swidden Agriculture," p. 280.
26. Ombo, Proceedings, p. 10.
9dispelled. Only a small minority of swidden cultivators in the Outer Islands 
are truly nomadic or seminomadic. For some, such as the Bukit of the Meratus 
Mountains in South Kalimantan, this nomadism is a way of adapting to, by fleeing 
from, potentially hostile intruders from the outside world, including loggers, 
miners, and land hungry lowland peasants, as well as government officers. 
For others, such as the urban and market-oriented lowlanders who make swiddens 
along newly built logging roads in East and South Kalimantan, this is a way 
of plundering government land of the greatest profit in the least amount of 
time.37 In contrast, most of the indigenous, traditional swidden cultivators 
of the Outer Islands have permanent villages and fixed, delineated village 
territories within which they make their swiddens. The Kantu* longhouse that 
I studied in West Kalimantan had been standing for twenty years at the time 
of my research, in a territory that was fixed at the end of the last century.
The sedentarism of an extensive agricultural people like the Kantu* is 
based on the use and reuse of the same forested land for swiddens. In the 
last year of my research with them, the Kantu* cleared less than one quarter 
of their new swiddens in primary forest, making the rest in secondary forest 
that had been cleared and cultivated at least once before. Most swidden culti­
vators in Indonesia clear all of their swiddens in previously cultivated secondary 
forest. This reuse of the land is typically associated with an indigenous 
system of land tenure, in which primary rights of use and devolution are held 
by individual households, while residual rights are held by the village as a 
whole. *» This pattern of land use and ownership is associated, in turn, with 
both the desire and the ability to conserve the productivity of the land—which 
means conserving its forest cover. Measures taken to ensure its conservation, 
and to fo res ta ll any threat of grassland succession, commonly include not 
clearing very young forest for swiddens, not cropping swiddens in rice two 
or more years in a row, and planting trees or bushes (e.g., durian, coffee, 
candlenut) on newly fallowed swiddens. The threat of fire to the forest (the 
magnitude of which, at least in rainforest areas, has been greatly exaggerated) 
is controlled through the use of firebreaks and human guards; and the threat 
of soil erosion is mitigated by the practice of leaving unburnt timber on 
the surface of the swidden, and by the staggered planting of a wide variety 
of cultigens (achieving a multistory effect).**
When swidden cultivators are forced to abandon their techniques of forest 
conservation as a consequence of increasing population/land ratios (which 
necessitate an increasing ratio of cropping time to fallow time), some alteration 
of the environment admittedly results. Most dramatically, the forest may succeed 
to a uniform cover of grass—typieally Imperata cylindrica (L.) Beauv.—which 
is not cultivable by swidden techniques. As noted earlier, this succession 
is much decried by the government and is the basis for many of its evaluations 2789
27. Andrew P. Vayda, "Research in East Kalimantan on Interactions between 
People and Forests: A Preliminary Report,” Borneo Research Bulletin 13, 1 
(1981): 3-15.
28. Dove, "Theories of Swidden Agriculture."
29. An important study done in Sarawak recorded less erosion from traditional 
rice swiddens than from terraced rice fields, pepper gardens, or even natural 
forest. See T. Hatch, "Shifting Cultivation in Sarawak: Past Present and 
Future," in Tropical Ecology and Development, Proceedings of the Vth International 
Symposium of Tropical Ecology, Kuala Lumpur, April 16-21, 1980, ed. J. I. Furtado 
(Kuala Lumpur: The International Society of Tropical Ecology, 1980), pp. 483-96.
10
of swidden cultivation as destructive. Such a view of grassland succession 
is in error, however, because it fails to recognize the relationship—in the 
evolution of agriculture—between population/land pressure, the intensity 
of cultivation, and the fallow  period vegetative cover. The intermediate 
stage in this evolution, characterized by medium population/land ratios and 
hoe or plough systems of agriculture, is in fact suited by a grassland cover.30 
Whereas forest is not susceptible to intensive cultivation by hoe and/or plough, 
grassland is. During the fallow periods in such cultivation, the grass cover 
also will restore the fertility of the soil and protect it against erosion.31 32
In addition, these grasslands—including those covered in the much disparaged 
Imperata—are a source of fodder and graze for the livestock whose manure 
and traction are used in their cultivation.3 3 Imperata can also support wild 
ruminants, such as the Sambhur deer,33 and in many areas it is valued accordingly 
by village hunters. Finally, Imperata is a valued material for roof thatch.
The farmers who thus exploit Imperata grasslands have a symbiotic relationship 
with them: just as the grasslands maintain the farmers, so do the farmers 
maintain the grasslands—primarily through the use of fire. In a frequently 
burned-over environment, Imperata tends to be more competitive than other 
plants, due to its extensive root system and its quick rate of growth. In 
the absence of such burning, Imperata grasslands eventually and spontaneously 
succeed back to forest.34 Thus, the grasslands are a transitional stage in 
ecosystemic succession, artificially arrested and prolonged by farmers whose 
subsistence strategies are best served by this vegetative cover; and not a
30. Boserup, Conditions of Agricultural Growthi Dove, "Theories of Swidden 
Agriculture"; idem, "Peasant Versus Government Perception and Use of the Environ­
ment: A Case Study of Banjarese Ecology and River Basin Development in South 
Kalimantan," Journal cf Southeast Asian Studies (in press).
31. Proceedings of Biotrop Workshop, p. 259; Goeswono Soepardi, "Alang-alang 
(Imperata Cylindrica [L .] Beauv.) and Animal Husbandry," in ibid., p. 63; 
George Sherman, "The Culture-bound Notion of ’Soil Fertility': On Interpreting 
Non-Western C riteria  of Selecting Land for Cultivation," Studies in Third 
World Societies 14 (1980): 487-511.
32. J. H. G. Holmes, C. Lemerle, and J. H. Schottler, "The Use of Imperata 
cylindrica (L.) Beauv. by Grazing Cattle in Papua New Guinea," in Proceedings 
of B iotrop Workshop, pp. 179-92; Bedjo Soewardi and Djoko Sastradipradja, 
"Alang- alang (Imperata Cylindrica [L.] Beauv.) and Soil Animal Husbandry," 
in ibid., pp. 157-78.
33. Michael R. Dove, "Man, Land and Game in Sumbawa: Some Observations on 
Agrarian Ecology and Development Policy in Eastern Indonesia," Singapore Journal 
of Tropical Geography 5 , 2 (1984): 112-24; C. Ngampongsai, "Sambar's Plant 
Foods in Khao-Yai National Park, Thailand," in Tropical Ecology and Development, 
ed. Furtado, pp. 295-301.
34. Conklin, Hanuno'o Agriculture, pp. 129-32; Dove, "Peasant Versus Government 
Perception"; J. H. H. Eussen, "Biological and Ecological Aspects of Alang-alang," 
in Proceedings of Biotrop Workshop, p. 21; P. H. Nye and D. J. Greenland, The 
Soil under Shifting Cultivation (Farnham Royal [England]: Commonwealth Agricultural 
Bureaux, 1960), p. 18; P. W. Richards, The Tropical Rain Forest (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1952), pp. 390-95; Ronald E. Seavoy, "The Origin of 
Tropical Grasslands in Kalimantan, Indonesia," Journal of Tropical Geography 
40 (1975): 49.
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climatic or edaphic climax, the unwanted product of destructive agricultural 
practices, as envisaged by the government. **
3. The Paradox
This brief review of the reality of systems of swidden agriculture in Outer 
Indonesia suggests that the official evaluation of these systems is fundamentally 
in error. This suggestion is supported—and the error is partially explained—by 
the near total lack of use of empirical evidence to substantiate the official 
view. In few if any articles, speeches, or conversations on this topic do offi­
cials cite empirically derived measures of crop yields (never, in any case, yields 
measured in terms of labor inputs) or dietary sufficiency, for example, to support 
the claim of an unproductive system of agriculture and a poverty-stricken class 
of agriculturalists.*« The relationship between swidden cultivation and export- 
crop production is never mentioned (much less utilized in development planning), 
nor are official statements regarding the destructiveness of swidden cultivation 
ever backed up with evidence, such as comparative measures of erosion from land 
under swidden cultivation versus other uses. Finally, alarmist statements 
regarding forest-grassland succession are never accompanied by any recognition 
of the actual factors (viz., agricultural ecology and economics) that not only 
precipitate but perpetuate this succession. The official view of swidden cultiva­
tion in the Outer Islands is not, therefore, merely one possible interpretation 
from a body of empirical evidence. It is more an article of faith, of dogma. * ’  
This dogma is not held by the swidden cultivators themselves. They entertain 
no myths about their system of agriculture, but are exactingly honest—both to 
one another and to sympathetic outsiders—about its strengths and weaknesses.
Whence comes this dichotomy between, on the one hand, the agroecological 
reality and the peasants' true perception of it, and, on the other hand, the 
official, dogmatic, and mythical view of that reality? Other observers have noted 
the general tendency for evaluations of swidden systems to vary greatly and, in 
the light of the abundance of empirical data available on such systems, have 
deemed this "paradoxical."** I do not view it as paradoxical at all. Following 35678
35. Dove, "Theories of Swidden Agriculture"; George Sherman, "What 'Green 
Desert'? The Ecology of Batak Grassland Farming," Indonesia 29 (1980): 113-48. 
Other farmers, living at both lower and higher levels of population/land pressure 
and agricultural intensification—which are not as well suited by a grassland 
cover—tend to hold appropriately more negative views of Imperata and other 
grasses (e.g., viewing them as pests or "weeds").
36. Even a simple and obvious indicator like per capita income does not support 
the view that the predominantly intensive agriculturalists of Java are better 
o ff than the predominantly extensive agriculturalists of the Outer Islands 
(Sievers, Mystical World of Indonesia, p. 195).
37. The latest twist in this dogma is denial of the very existence of swidden 
cultivation in the Outer Islands. Since swidden cultivation is proscribed, 
constrained, and discriminated against by official government policy, and since 
reporting something that should not exist is problematic within the government 
bureaucracy, provincia l-level officials in the Outer Islands routinely deny 
that any swidden agriculture remains in their areas. This is the primary reason 
for the absence of reliable statistics on swidden cultivation in Indonesia today.
38. Pedro A. Sanchez, Properties and Management of Soils in the Tropics (New 
York: Wiley, 1976), p. 345.
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Wallerstein, I suggest that the swidden cultivators perceive the reality and 
the government does not, because this suits their respective self-interests. 
The government's perception can be called an "ideological deflection" from 
rea lity .**  My thesis is that this "deflection" rationalizes and supports 
policies for administering the land and people of the Outer Islands that are less 
in the interest of those people than in the interest of the central government. 
I do not suggest that this deflection is conscious or manifest but that it 
is latent, due both to its pervasiveness and its historical depth.
IV . Land Use and Government in Ancient Java
The contemporary central government's perception of swidden agriculture 
in the Outer Islands is analogous to the central governments' perceptions 
of swidden agriculture in ancient Java (and contemporary relations between 
Inner and Outer Indonesia are analogous to those between the lowland kingdoms 
and the inhabitants of the mountain forests in early Java). These latter 
perceptions were a function of the particular relationships that obtained 
between the early kingdoms, on the one hand, and their land and people, on 
the other.
1. The State and the Land
The early, inland, Hinduized kingdoms of Java were agrarian in nature. 
Pigeaud writes that in the time of Majapahit, for example, the incomes of 
the court, the aristocracy, and the church were all derived from agriculture— 
whether directly through the labor of bondsmen, or indirectly through taxes on 
freemen.39 40 412 The system of agriculture that produced this income was intensive, much 
of it being irrigated rice cultivation. Irrigated agriculture is associated with 
(or more accurately, is necessitated by) capital investment in agriculture, 
greater intensity of cultivation of the land, and the concentration of popula­
tion— all of which enhance a state's control of an agricultural population 
and its ability to extract a portion of the agricultural produce. This control 
also enables the state (or its landlords) to obtain longer working days from 
the agricultural laborers, which at least partia lly offset the relatively 
low returns on labor that characterize such intensive systems of agriculture.4*
The state could only compel its subjects to work these longer hours so 
long as they remained its subjects. Java was then still covered with vast 
wilderness areas beyond the authority of any kings, to which the various subject, 
agricultural populations could and did fle e .43 Indeed, Schrieke claimed that 
such "agricultural desertions," as he termed them, may have been responsible 
for the major tenth century shift in population from Mataram in Central Java
39. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture 
and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New 
York: Academic Press, 1974), p. 4.
40. Theodore G. Th. Pigeaud, Java in the Fourteenth Century, 5 vols. (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1960-63), 5: 467.
41. Boserup, Conditions of Agricultural Growth, pp. 71-73.
42. Soemarsaid Moertono, State and Statecraft in Old Java, rev. ed. (Ithaca: 
Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1981), p. 75; Pigeaud, Java in the Fourteenth 
Century, 4: 471.
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to the Brantas area of East Java.4* In their wilderness refuges, these peoples 
easily subsisted by practicing swidden agriculture.4 4 I suggest that it was 
precisely this ability to make swiddens in the forest wildernesses that made 
fligh t not only possible but attractive, compared with the more intensive 
irrigated rice agriculture within the kingdoms. According to the evidence 
previously discussed, the return on labor of an owner-worker is 88 percent 
higher in a swidden than in an irrigated field. This comparison is based 
on swidden cultivation in contemporary, secondary forests. Much of the historic 
swidden cultivation in Java, especially by refugees, would have been carried 
out in primary forests, in which the return on labor tends to be even higher—9.4 
kilograms/workday among the contemporary Kantu', or 124 percent higher than 
irrigated rice in contemporary Java. The differential would have been greater 
still in ancient Java, when the return the cultivator received from the irrigated 
field would have been further reduced by taxes (in the case of freemen) or 
the landlord/master (in the case of bondsmen). Moertono, citing Rouffaer, 
notes that, under one widespread system of court taxation, the peasant cultivator 
retained only 40 percent of the produce of his land.4* The refugees* harvests, 
on the other hand, would not have been diminished by state extraction.43 4 456
The state appears to have exercised little  control over any of the swidden 
forest communities, whether renegade or not.47
This is not to suggest that the cultural ecology of ancient Java was clearly 
divided between the court-ruled intensive agricultural communities of the 
lowlands, on the one hand, and the independent, swidden-based communities 
of the forested uplands, on the other. The actual situation was doubtlessly 
more complex. At some times in some places, the two types of communities 
were probably separated by more of a continuum than a clear dichotomy. In 
particular, in areas lying on the fringes of one court's power or between 
the dominions of two separate courts, it is likely that there were communities 
with some of the characteristics of both the above types—subject partially 
but not wholly to the king's authority, and practicing the cultivation of 
both swiddens and w et-rice fields. In such areas, the court's ability to
43. B. Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies, 2 vols. (Amsterdam: Royal 
Tropical Institute, 1955), 2: 301.
44. Sievers, Mystical World of Indonesia, p. 85.
45. Moertono, State and Statecraft, pp. 116, 126-27.
46. The historical cultivation of wet rice may well have been less intensive—and 
hence yielded a higher return on labor—than in contemporary Central Java, 
from whence the production data used in this paper were taken. However, since 
the historic wet-rice fields were heavily taxed, and since the historic swiddens 
were not only untaxed but cut (in many cases) from the more profitable primary 
forest, it is likely that the net return on the worker's labor in the former 
was still at least as far below the return in the latter as in contemporary 
Indonesia.
47. The independence of the forest dwellers is indirectly attested to by 
the case of the mandala "sacred ring" communities of the Majapahit era. They 
too typically were located in remote, forested mountain regions, where their 
people subsisted by swidden agriculture. Of importance here is the fact that 
they enjoyed considerable independence from the court and court regulations, 
as was tacitly acknowledged in court records from that period. (Pigeaud, 
Java in the Fourteenth Century, 4: 390, 486.)
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prescribe agricultural practices, as well as to extract from these practices, 
would vary according to the distance from the court and the possibilities for 
flight.
The two variables along the spatial continuum—political subjugation versus 
freedom, and intensive versus extensive agricultural practices—relate to one 
another as independent and dependent variables, respectively. That is, while the 
people (whether agricultural deserters or indigenes) in these forest communities 
of swidden cultivation were relatively free, they were not free because they were 
swidden cultivators. It is less accurate to say that swidden cultivation fostered 
political freedom in such cases, than to say that freedom itself was what made 
swidden cultivation possible. There is no question that swidden cultivation 
can, and indeed has, become the basis for statelike sociopolitical formations.4* 
What is more important here is that the environment of historical Java was also 
able to support more intensive irrigated rice cultivation, which—as was suggested 
earlier—is more easily exploited by a state apparatus. Swidden agriculture is 
less easily exploited because of its typically low population density, low capital 
inputs, and low output per unit of area; as well as its high ratio of crop species 
to land and of fallowed to cultivated land, as well as the high mobility of its 
practitioners. These characteristics do not rule out the possibility of state 
extraction, but they make it relatively less profitable than in the more intensive 
systems of cultivation that could be developed on the same lands. As a result, 
whenever and wherever states arose in ancient Java, they by preference developed 
the extant systems of swidden agriculture into systems of irrigated agriculture. 
Consequently, the practice of swidden agriculture in a given area indicated that 
it was not then under the effective political and economic control of one of 
the historic kingdoms, but it did not explain the absence of this control. 
Therefore, the common argument that the limitations (e.g., demographic limitations) 
of swidden agriculture constrain the development of the state4* reverses the 
true causal relationship: namely, the extent of development of the state is what 
constrains the continued practice of swidden agriculture.
The alternative argument, that the distribution of intensive and extensive 
systems of agriculture in ancient Java was a function of varying ecological 
conditions—irrigated rice in the lowlands and swidden rice in the forested 
mountains~is not supported by the available evidence.*0 The particular environ­
ments that supported irrigated rice cultivation would have supported swidden rice 
cultivation as well. There is no characteristic of lowland Java that would 
have been inimical to swidden agriculture; and indeed it is likely that this 
was the autocthonous system of agriculture in all of the areas where irrigated 
agriculture was eventually developed.41 Similarly, there is no characteristic 489501
48. D. £. Dumond, "Swidden Agriculture and the Rise of Maya Civilization," 
Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 17 (1961): 301-16.
49. Cf. J. Friedman, "Tribes, States and Transformations," in Marxist Analyses 
and Social Anthropology, ed. M. Bloch (New York: Wiley, 1975); A. Thomas Kirsch, 
Feasting and Social Oscilla tion: Religion and Society in Upland Southeast 
Asia (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1973); Edmund R. Leach, Political 
Systems of Highland Burma: A Study of Kachin Social Structure (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1954).
50. Cf. Chris Field, "Comments on the Symposium from a Geographic Perspective," 
in Irrigation's Impact on Society, ed. Downing and Gibson, p. 173.
51. The spread of irrigated rice fields in Java, at the expense of more extensive
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of Java's highlands that would have inhibited the practice of irrigated agriculture 
there. Quite the contrary, since wet rice can be grown at higher elevations 
than dry rice (because otherwise fatal fluctuations in temperature are dampened 
by the irrigation water), irrigated cultivation arguably would have been more 
adapted to Java's highlands than swidden cultivation. Clearly, irrigated 
rice cultivation developed in Java's lowlands not only because the environment 
made it possible there but also because the developing states made it necessary; 
and swidden agriculture persisted in Java's highlands not because it was necessary 
there but because the absence of state control made it possible.
2. The State and the People
From the standpoint of the early Javanese state, these forest communities 
of swidden cultivators did not merely represent land and people beyond its 
control; they represented an active threat to its control. As stated earlier, 
some of these communities were formed or joined by agricultural laborers fleeing 
the control of the state. Evidence of this problem, and also of its recognition 
as such by the state, is provided in court records of once-cultivated land 
lying unworked and abandoned. The flight of laborers, and the abandonment 
of their land, reduced the agricultural extraction upon which the state rested. 
In order to maintain and increase this extraction, the state needed to maintain 
and increase the number of people laboring in intensive agricultural systems 
within its dominions. ** This can only be achieved by force in any situation 
where the practice of intensive agriculture is not otherwise necessitated 
by high population/land ratios and the unavailability of land for more extensive 
agricu lture.** Such high ratios have not prevailed throughout Java until 
the twentieth century, and they certainly did not prevail in ancient Java, 
even in the vicinity of the major courts.*4
The only recourse of the kingdoms of ancient Java to maintain the systems of 
intensive agriculture upon which their economies depended, therefore, was 
to employ some form of coercion. Coercion was employed both to maintain extant 
populations of farmers within the state's dominions, and to transfer to such areas 
farmers from poorly controlled frontier territories and from the territories of 
rival states defeated in battle. These transfers of population** are particularly 
dramatic evidence of the association at that time between political power 
and population, as opposed to political power and land. The source of this 5234
systems of cultivation, has been a relatively recent phenomenon. As Geertz 
notes, most of Java's wet-rice acreage has been developed within the past 
150 years. See Geertz, Agricultural Involution, p. 34.
52. Pigeaud, Java in the Fourteenth Century, 4: 300-301, 472.
53. Boserup, Conditions of Agricultural Growth, pp. 72-73, 84.
54. Even into the nineteenth century, political power in rural Java rested 
on the control of agricultural labor not agricultural land, and one of the 
principal threats to such power continued to be the possibility of this labor 
"flee ing to other terr ito ries  or leaving the established order by opening 
land in the woods." Onghokam, "The Inscrutable and the Paranoid: An Investigation 
into the Sources of the Brotodiningrat A ffair," in Southeast Asian Transitions: 
Approaches through Social History, ed. Ruth T. McVey (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1978), p. 118.
55. See Pigeaud, Java in the Fourteenth Century, 4: 300-301.
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power lay in exploiting the labor of the population in intensive systems of 
agriculture. The explicit interest of the state in intensive, permanent field 
agriculture is evident in this speech by Prince Wengker of the Majapahit court
The principal of it; gagas [unirrigated permanent fields], sawahs 
[irrigated permanent fields], anything that is planted: that it may 
thrive, it must be guarded and treated with care. As much of the 
land as has been made into karZtman [rural community] territory, 
should remain permanently so, without going to waste. *«
The state would not have had to coerce directly the practice of intensive 
agriculture, which probably occurred at the initiative of the farmers themselves, 
under pressure from the state’ s concentration of population. The state’ s 
support for constructing, maintaining, and utilizing irrigation and flood-control 
works represented not the product of this agricultural intensification but 
its cause, and not the cause of this population concentration but its product.
The necessity for the state to control and coerce its population, in order 
to develop and maintain an intensive system of agriculture in such circumstances, 
is not widely understood.*7 This has led to much confusion regarding the 
relations between people and state in early Java. For example, van Setten 
van der Meer states that the inhabitants of the early kingdoms depended for 
their welfare and prosperity on wet-rice cultivation and on the attendant 
provision and control of water by the state.** It would be truer to say that 
the welfare of the state depended on the exploitation of the populace through 
the medium of irrigated agriculture. Her misunderstanding of the basic nature 
of this relationship is related to her belief that irrigated rice agriculture 
in Java preceded the formation of the Indianized states and was merely overlaid 
by the apparatus of the state, to the benefit of both.** I have been arguing 
here that the intensification of rice cultivation in most places was preceded 
by a concentration of population; and since Java's population density was 56789
56. Ibid., 3: 103-4.
57. For example, see Wallerstein’ s assertion that within the sixteenth century 
European world economy, extensive agriculture could be carried out with slaves 
or coerced wage laborers, but intensive agriculture required free laborers. 
(Wallerstein, Modern World System, p. 104.) He bases this assertion on the 
apparent association between intensive agriculture and self-employment in the 
center of the world economy (viz., Europe), and the association between less 
intensive, plantation agriculture and coerced labor in its periphery (viz., the 
tropical colonies or trading partners). He fails to recognize that the high 
population/land pressure, which he notes was associated with the practice of 
intensive agriculture in Europe, is by itself sufficient reason for this practice. 
Hence, the European intensive agriculturalists were relatively free from state 
coercion only because the coercive element was already supplied by the population 
itself. He also fails to recognize that the agriculture of which he speaks on 
the world system's periphery, while possibly less intensive than the agriculture 
at the system’s center, was nevertheless sufficiently more intensive than the 
native subsistence agriculture to necessitate state coercion. For a different 
view, see Onghokam, "Inscrutable and Paranoid," p. 118.
58. N. C. van Setten van der Meer, Sawah Cultivation in Ancient Java: Aspects 
of Development during the Indo-Javanese Period, 5th to 15th Century (Canberra: 
Australian National University Press, 1979), p. 78.
59. Ibid., pp. 53, 61 n., 74, 133.
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then relatively low, only a state or statelike formation—whether Indianized 
or indigenous—could have achieved this.
Benedict Anderson appreciates the basic nature of this relationship between 
the concentration and control of population, on the one hand, and an extracted 
agricultural surplus and the power of the state on the other. *° However, while 
he recognizes the relationship between population and power, he does not appear 
to accept the antecedent relationship between population and agriculture. 
He writes: nOnly the concentration of large populations made possible [emphasis 
added] by intensive rice cultivation could provide the economic surplus and 
reserve of manpower necessary for building monuments or armies."41 This suggests 
that he sees a causal sequence beginning with (1) wet-rice agriculture, which 
permits (2) the concentration of population, which leads to and represents 
(3) politica l power. Following Boserup,** I reject this Malthusian view of 
population growth and agricultural development and suggest instead that a 
precondition for agricultural intensification is the growth and/or concentration 
of population, whether natural or as a result of state coercion. The distinction 
is a significant one: the first position assumes agricultural evolution (viz., 
to more intensive forms) while trying to explain population growth and the 
creation of political power; whereas the second position, and the one adopted 
in this article, assumes the existence of political power and tries to explain 
the growth or concentration of population and the evolution of agriculture.
This non-Malthusian approach leads, in my view, to a better understanding of 
the Javanese concept of power. Anderson writes, and correctly I believe, that, 
according to this concept, large dense populations are a sign of power, and this 
power precedes wealth (or wealth follows this power).** This is at variance with 
his own, just-quoted statement on the precedence of intensive rice cultivation to 
the concentration of population. This precedence implies either that intensive 
cultivation is itself the sign of power, or that it is a sign of wealth that does 
not follow but precedes the sign of power (viz., the concentration of population). 
By recognizing (as in this article) the priority of state control/concentration 
of population to agricultural intensification, it is clear that, as Anderson 
suggests, the population is indeed a sign of (political) power and it does 
necessarily precede the creation of (agricultural) wealth.** This will probably 
be true of any society of intensive agriculturalists governed by a statelike 
formation; whereas the relationship is likely to be reversed in any society 
of extensive agriculturalists, governed by tribal, "big man" institutions. In 
these latter cases, political control and concentration of the population are 
not prerequisites to the practice of agriculture. Rather is the successful 
practice of agriculture a prerequisite to the amassing of political power, which 
is achieved through the distribution and redistribution of foodstuffs.** Here 6012345
60. Benedict R. CFG. Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," in 
Culture and P o litics  in Indonesia, ed. Claire Holt et al. (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1972), p. 30.
61. Ibid.
62. Boserup, Conditions of Agricultural Growth.
63. Anderson, "Idea of Power," pp. 30, 41, 48.
64. Cf. Onghokam, "Inscrutable and Paranoid," pp. 115-16, 122-23.
65. Marshall Sahlins, "Poor Man, Rich Man, Big-Man, Chief: Political Types 
in Melanesia and Polynesia," Comparative Studies in Society and History 5 
(1963): 285-303.
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wealth clearly does not follow power. Indeed, the latter can only be amassed 
through, in a sense, the loss of the former. Rather, here power follows from 
wealth.
3. The State and Forests
The efforts of the early states to protect their agricultural bases went 
beyond the forcib le proscription of flight to, and the practice of swidden 
cultivation within, the forest wildernesses. As Terry Rambo has written, 
a society that does not live in, or understand, the forest can exploit it 
in three ways: first, it can utilize forest-dwelling groups as intermediaries; 
second, it can become a forest-dwelling group itself; and third, it can convert 
the forest to an artificial agroecosystem more suited to exploitation by a 
nonforest people. ** This last alternative was the one adopted by Java’ s early 
states. Records such as the Nagara Kertagama make clear that a continuing 
concern of the early courts was to open up the forests for new agricultural 
lands, using both bonded labor and the labor of free men for this purpose.** 
These efforts were constrained by the amount of total labor available, not 
only to clear the forest, but then to cultivate continually the land thus 
opened, since land le ft uncultivated would soon have reverted back to forest.
The courts cleared land from forest and/or prevented already cleared land 
from reverting to forest in the course not only of agriculture but also of 
hunting wild ruminants and grazing domesticated ones. Rangeland for hunting 
and grazing was created, maintained, and exploited through the periodic use 
of fire .** Burning rejuvenates grasslands by replacing older and taller grasses 
with younger and shorter ones. The latter are more nutritious for livestock 
and wild game, and they also facilitate the sighting and pursuit (for example, 
on horseback) of the game by hunters. Fire is used during the hunt as well, 
to drive the game from cover. Finally, periodic burning of the grasslands 
eliminates extant ligneous growth and retards new growth, thereby forestalling 
the otherwise inevitable succession of the grasslands back to forest. In 
some cases this burning was undertaken directly by the court, as evidenced 
in court records that refer to large-scale royal hunts in grassland wildernesses, 
accompanied by the use of fire. * * In other cases, the court left the care 
of particular grasslands in the hands of nearby villages, in return for which 
the villages were exempted from royal taxes and duties.6 7890
66. A. Terry Rambo, "Of Stones and Stars: Malaysian Orang Asli Environmental 
Knowledge in Relation to Their Adaptation to the Tropical Rain Forest Ecosystem," 
[Malaysian] Federation Museum Journal 25 (1980): 86.
67. Pigeaud, Java in the Fourteenth Century, 4: 300.
68. Cf. Dove, "Man, Land and Game in Sumbawa."
69. Pigeaud, Java in the Fourteenth Century, 4: 300.
70. Ibid., p. 455. In the one case cited by Pigeaud, he attributes the court's 
in terest in such grasslands to a desire for thatching material. (Ibid., pp. 
456-57.) Thatch was doubtless an important product of these managed grasslands— 
but it probably was not the sole product. Pigeaud appears to have overlooked 
the value of the grasslands for hunting and herding, despite the fact that 
one passage in his translation of the Nagara Kertagama describes not only 
a grassland hunt but the associated use of fire as well. Ibid., p. 300.
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The grasslands thus created and maintained were of no use to the forest­
dwelling swidden agriculturalists. They would have had little  more inclination 
to cultivate these grasslands than they had to cultivate irrigated rice, since 
neither would yield as high a return on labor as did their cultivation of 
the forest.71 723 Moreover, their forest-based adaptation precluded the possibility 
of raising many livestock, so they would not have needed the grasslands for 
herding. At the same time, the forest presented access to a rich variety 
of game, so they would not have needed the grasslands for hunting either. 
The expansion of Java's grasslands was not only of economic benefit to the 
early courts, therefore, but also of political benefit, to the extent that 
it reduced the exploitable territory of the courts’ perceived enemies.
The efforts of the ancient states to open up Java's forests were directly 
and functionally associated with the spread of the influence of these states, 
and they became similarly associated in Javanese ideology. This is explicitly 
attested to in the title of the Islamic court annals of Central Java, Babad 
Tanah Djawi, "babad" meaning not only "history" but also "to clear land by 
cutting growth."7* Just as cleared land became associated with the rise of the 
Javanese states and their cultures, so too did the forest come to be associated 
with uncivilized, uncontrollable, and fearful forces. The latter came to be 
perceived as supernatural forces, such as Durga; 7* but the historical basis for 
this fear was empirical, since the swidden cultivators of ancient Java were 
neither part of the reigning court culture nor—and this is most important—under 
its control. 74 75 Finally, just as the opening of the forest came to be associated 
with the rise of Javanese civilization, so did the reversal of this process 
come to be seen as the eternal, mortal threat to this civilization. This 
is evident from Javanese beliefs regarding Agni, the god of fire who destroys 
the world and/or turns it into a vast fo rest.7* This belief in a fire that 
creates forest and thereby destroys civilization is structurally related to 
the role of fire in Java's historic swidden systems. Fire was used to destroy 
the forest (temporarily), and thereby create or support the antithesis of 
civilization. The fact that the burning of the forest is shortly thereafter 
followed by the spontaneous reforestation of the erstwhile swiddens explains 
the association of fire with the creation of the forest. The fact that the
71. Forest-based swidden cultivators will begin to cultivate grassland only 
when increasing population/land pressure has obviated the possibility of further 
maintenance and cultivation of a forest cover. Since there was no such pressure 
during the historical era under discussion (except within the court-controlled 
regions of intensive agriculture), Pigeaud's suggestion (Java in the Fourteenth 
Century, 4s 146-47, 494) that it was the swidden cultivators who were creating 
(if not exploiting) the grasslands is highly improbable.
72. Elinor C. Horne, Javanese-English Dictionary (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1974), pp. 45-46.
73. Stephen C. Headley, "The Ritual Lancing of Durga's Buffalo in Surakarta 
and the Offering of Its Blood in Krendowahono Forest," in Between People and 
Statistics : Essays on Modern Indonesian History, ed. Francien van Anrooij 
et al. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), pp. 49-58.
74. Not only did the forests contain people beyond the control of the courts, 
it  contained people who were contesting this control, such as bandits and 
pretenders to the thrones (Moertono, State and Statecraft, pp. 79-80, 85).
75. Headley, "Ritual Lancing," pp. 55-57.
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people who lived from this system of forest farming were politically independent 
explains the association of fire and forest with the end of the (civilized) 
world. In its original Indian form, the myth of Agni and the burning of the 
forest was a tale not only of destruction but of re-creation as well. The 
absence of the element of re-creation in the Javanese version of the myth 7« 
probably reflects the political and economic threat to the Javanese states 
inherent in the burning of the forest.
4. The Heritage
The political and economic realities of state formation in historic Java, 
as just discussed, necessarily became associated with a set of distinctive 
attitudes towards land and people and the relations between them. These are:
(1) a strong preference for concentrated, as opposed to dispersed, populations;
(2) a related preference for open cultivated land and a dislike for forested 
"wilderness" land, and for anything dwelling therein;76 7 78(3) a related preference 
for intensive (viz., irrigated) as opposed to extensive (viz., swidden) systems 
of agriculture; and (4) a related tendency to compare and evaluate systems 
of land use in terms of return per unit of area as opposed to unit of labor. 
These attitudes originated in the ancient Javanese courts, but they have persisted 
into the colonial and modern eras, as will now be discussed.7*
76. Ibid., p. 55.
77. The historical and contemporary prejudice against forest-based agriculture
has a linguistic referent. In the uplands of Central Java, the forest swiddens 
that were still being cut and farmed until the beginning of this century were 
locally called wana in high Javanese or alas in low Javanese; both of which 
terms also mean "forest" or "jungle." This identification of swidden with
forest, this fa ilu re to distinguish between the two, clearly reflects the 
historical prejudice being traced in the text. It suggests that a swidden 
is not cultivated land, but is in effect still a part of the jungle. Indeed, 
it suggests that a swidden is no different and no better than a jungle itself.
There is also dramatic congruence between historical and contemporary views 
of the forest as a place of refuge for the enemies of society. In the wake of 
a 1983 campaign to arrest all of the criminal elements in Java, a military
official said in a newspaper interview that he was worried that some criminals 
had escaped the campaign by hiding out in the forests of Central Java (Kedaulatan 
Rakyat [Yogyakarta], September 14, 1983). In a province with an average population 
density of 735 persons per square kilometer, and in which forests cover only 
19 percent of the total area, the mythical nature of this fear is clearly 
evident. Its historical source is evident in the fact that in Java's settled
lowlands today, an evil person may still be called—with no possibility of
literal intent~wong alasan "forest dweller."
78. This is not to say that the attitudes of the ancient courts have persisted 
without change up to the present day. A notable example of one attitude that 
has undergone considerable change is that towards Imperata grasslands. The 
historical states, such as Majapahit, valued these grasslands and endeavored 
to ensure their maintenance and preservation. In contrast, the contemporary 
national government is exerting great efforts to exterminate all Imperata 
grasslands. This change in attitude is explained by changes since the fourteenth 
century in population density, intensity of cultivation, and the possibilities 
for state exploitation—not only on Java but in the Outer Islands of Indonesia 
as well. As a consequence of these changes, possibilities for state extraction
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V. Land Use and Government in Colonial Java
The colonial government continued the prejudice of the early Javanese 
states in favor of intensive, w et-rice agriculture and against extensive, 
swidden agriculture, terming the latter the "robber economy." In the case 
of the colonial government, however, this prejudice was based less on the 
ease of extraction from irrigated agriculture compared with swidden agriculture, 
than on the ease of extraction from the systems of cash cropping that became 
associated with irrigated agriculture.7* Thus, the "culture" system of the 
Dutch colonial government was applied largely to wet rice as opposed to swidden 
areas. Sugar cane—which could be grown in association with irrigated rice—became 
a culture-system crop, while rubber—quintessential^ the cash crop of swidden 
farmers—did not. •• This difference was due not to the agronomic requirements 
of one crop versus another, nor to the greater marketability of one crop versus 
another, but rather to greater susceptibility to more intensive, larger scale, 
and more profitable (for the government) systems of cultivation.*1 The peasants' 
response to the colonial government's program of agricultural development 
and intensification was no different from that of their forebears to the programs 
of the early Javanese kingdoms. Many of those who were involved in the program 
fled to areas beyond government control; •* and all of those who were not involved 798012
from grasslands that existed in the fourteenth century no longer exist today—hence 
the change in the state's attitude towards this particular vegetative cover. 
But there has been no change in the basis for the state's evaluation of this 
or any other land cover: namely, the susceptibility to state extraction of 
that land cover or land use compared to alternate covers and uses.
79. Geertz, Agricultural Involution, p. 111.
80. Sievers, Mystical World of Indonesia, p. 108; Geertz, Agricultural Involution, 
p. 54. It should be noted, however, that some cash crops cultivated by swidden 
farmers, such as coffee, were included in the culture system.
81. For example, there was nothing either agriculturally or historically 
necessary about the intensive cultivation of sugar in tandem with irrigated rice. 
Before this colonial development, sugar had been grown solely as a subsistence 
food crop in the swiddens, gardens, and dryland fields of Indonesia. Thereafter 
it was grown for the market in a swidden-based, Chinese-run ratoon system in 
the forests around Batavia. (Sievers, Mystical World of Indonesia, p. 91.) 
It was finally integrated with irrigated rice in an intensive, permanent field 
system of cultivation only because this suited the economic interests of the 
colonial government more than did cultivation by either of the two prior systems. 
The priority of the government's interests in this development is reflected 
in its active efforts to suppress the earlier systems of sugar cultivation. 
(G. M. van der Kolff, "An Economic Case Study: Sugar and Welfare in Java," in 
Approaches to Community Development, ed. E. P. Knopp [The Hague: Van Hoeve, 
1953].) The absence of any peasant interest in this intensification of sugar 
cultivation has been convincingly documented by Geertz in Agricultural Involution.
82. Writing of conditions at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Raffles 
wrote: "the coffee culture in the Sunda districts has sometimes been so severely 
exacted, that together with the other constant and heavy demands made by the 
European authority on the labor of the country, they deprived the unfortunate 
peasants of the time necessary to rear food for their support. Many have 
thus perished by famine, while others have fled to the crags of the mountains, 
where raising a scanty subsistence in patches of gaga [swidden] or oftener
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continued to practice their traditional, extensive system of agriculture, 
so long as their own population/land balances permitted.*1
Although the colonial government could not exploit most systems of swidden 
agriculture and their associated systems of cash cropping, it did not simply 
leave these systems alone, for it could and did profit from alternate exploitation 
of the lands and crops involved.*4 It dealt with the swidden lands with the 
Agrarian Act of 1870, which designated all "waste lands" as thenceforth state 
lands, to be disposed of as the state chose.** The choices typically were 
either commercial timber extraction or the plantation cultivation of cash 
crops. ** The colonial government dealt with the burgeoning systems of smallholder 
cultivation of cash crops with various restrictive measures, such as the rubber 
restriction scheme. In all cases, the systems of agriculture that were most 
susceptible to extraction by the colonial government were supported, and the 
systems that were least susceptible were suppressed. It was this insusceptibility 
that led the Dutch to label swidden agriculture a "robber economy"—not, that 
is, because it  robbed from either its practitioners or the environment in 
which it was practiced, but because it was not readily subject to extraction 
by the colonial government.*7
The agrarian policy of the colonial government differed from that of the early 
kingdoms in its emphasis on the cultivation of cash crops, both in tandem with 
subsistence food crops and in plantations. This difference is due to the fact 
that the early Javanese states were agrarian empires, whose route of development 
lay in concentrating population and intensifying their subsistence-oriented 
agriculture; whereas the colonial government was a player in the European world 
economy, whose route of development lay in extensifying its market-oriented 
agriculture to peripheral areas such as Indonesia.** However, in terms of a 
basic commitment to state extraction, and in terms of a related tendency to 
evaluate d ifferen t agricultural systems in terms of possibilities for such 
extraction, there is great similarity between the colonial government and the 
early kingdoms. This similarity throws new light on "dualistic" interpretations 
of Java's economic and political history. The theory of the "dual economy" 
has been used to explain the purported division during the colonial era between 834567
dependent for it upon the roots of the forest, . . . they congratulated themselves 
on their escape from the reach of their oppressors." Thomas Stamford Raffles, 
The History of Java, 2 vols. (London: Murray, 1817), 1: 129. Writing of conditions 
la ter in the nineteenth century, Sievers speaks of "the resumption of the 
ancient pattern of wholesale migration of entire villages to escape local 
authorities." Sievers, Mystical World of Indonesia, p. 117.
83. Cf. Boserup, Conditions of Agricu ltura l Growth, pp. 59-61; Moertono, 
State and Statecraft, pp. 75-76; Raffles, History of Java, 1: 118.
84. Cf. Joseph E. Spencer, Shifting Cultivation in Southeastern Asia (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1966), p. 74.
85. Geertz, Agricultural Involution, pp. 83-84.
86. Sievers, Mystical World of Indonesia, p. 124.
87. George Sherman is one of the few scholars to have noted this political- 
economic bias in the Dutch colonial government's perceptions of forest and 
also grassland-based subsistence agricultural systems. See Sherman, "What 
'Green Desert'?" p. 126.
88. Wallerstein, Modern World-System I.
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a European-run, capital-intensive, export-crop sector on the one hand, and 
an indigenous sector of uncapitalized, subsistence-oriented agriculture, on 
the other. According to this theory, the dual economy was created by the 
introduction of colonial, capitalist, plantation agriculture into a traditional, 
precapitalist, agricultural economy. •» It is further said that the irrationality 
of this traditional economy both necessitated the capitalist intrusion and 
then perpetuated and exacerbated the resulting dualism.
Dualist theory, in the light of the preceding analysis of the attitudes of 
both contemporary governments and early kingdoms towards Indonesian agriculture, 
appears to be but another example of ideological deflection. Just as the 
early kingdoms depended upon the extraction of income from farmers in intensive, 
carefully controlled agricultural systems, so too did the Dutch colonialists; 
but the Dutch justified their intrusion, and then removed from themselves 
any blame for its ill effects, by citing the "irrationality” of the Indonesian 
farmers. 89 0 The functional linkage between this concept of irrationality and 
the economic interests of the colonial government is clear in the work of 
J. H. Boeke. As one aspect of the irrationality of the traditional Indonesian 
peasant economy, he notes that it is consumer oriented and not production 
oriented.91 In other words, production is geared to the varying consumption 
needs of the household as opposed to the varying demands of the market. This 
is a characteristic of any peasant agricultural economy—such as Indonesia's 
swidden economies—in which the major constraint is scarce labor and not land.92 93
Where production is constrained by labor, farmers tend to maximize returns 
on it as opposed to those on land, and as a result they are generally consumption 
oriented, as opposed to production or market oriented. By labeling this orien­
tation "irrationa l," Boeke betrays his bias: anything that is not oriented 
towards the colonial markets and economy is by definition "irrational."
The "irra tiona lity " of the swidden agriculturalists partially redounded 
to their benefit. Since their key resource was their labor not their land, 
they remained relatively free from the colonial economy—not in the sense 
that no pressure was ever put on them to cease making swiddens, but in the 
sense that their swiddens mostly were not incorporated into the culture system. 
Because they were more free they were less hurt. The proponents of dualist 
theory have recognized that dualism had a much less deleterious impact on 
swidden cultivators than on wet-rice cultivators.99 This is a problematic 
observation for these theorists, since they associate a more deleterious impact 
with a more irrational system of native agriculture, yet they certainly would 
not maintain that the system of swidden agriculture was more rational than 
the system of irrigated agriculture. In fact, it is not possible to explain
89. J. H. Boeke, Economics and Economic Policy of Dual Societies as Exemplified 
by Indonesia (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1953); Sievers, Mystical 
World of Indonesia, pp. 87, 281.
90. Cf. Geoffrey B. Hainsworth, "Beyond Dualism? Village Level Modernization 
and the Process of Integration into National Economies in Southeast Asia," 
in Village-Level Modernization in Southeast Asia: The Political Economy of 
Rice and Water (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1982), p. 22.
91. Boeke, Economics and Economic Policy, pp. 39-41.
92. Cf. A. V. Chayanov, The Theory of Peasant Economy (Homewood: Irwin, 1966); 
Dove, "Chayanov Slope in a Swidden Economy."
93. See, for example, Sievers, Mystical World of Indonesia, pp. 287-88, 304-5.
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the differing impact of the colonial economy on these two systems of agriculture 
in terms of the systems' greater or lesser rationality, but only in terms 
of the systems' greater or lesser vulnerability to state extraction.
Geertz has also suggested that the technological dualism of the Indonesian 
economy (along with regional imbalance and agricultural involution) was due not 
to any intrinsic aspect of Indonesian culture, but rather to the impact of colonial 
policy on traditional Indonesian agriculture. Thus, he maintains that the real 
dichotomy in the Indonesian economy during the colonial era was between the native 
sector and the foreign sector.*4 This native/foreign dichotomy is not, however, 
much more accurate than the rational/irrational dichotomy of the dualists. The 
native agriculture of which Geertz speaks was actually only one part of the 
traditional sector, nor was it the most native part. It was that system of 
intensive agriculture first developed by the early Javanese states to facilitate 
their extraction of an agricultural surplus, and then continued under the Dutch 
for essentially the same reason. The other, actually more native system of 
agriculture, namely swidden cultivation, was both more free of the colonial 
economy and more integrated into the international market— referring here to 
the historically very successful and re la tive ly  independent cultivation of 
smallholder export crops by the swidden cultivators. These cultivators more 
closely resembled "natural," Janus-faced peasants than did the wet-rice culti­
vators. Hence, the colonial Indonesian economy can perhaps more fruitfully be 
broken down into a tripartite  structure: the totally intrusive plantation 
agriculture; the partially intrusive, oppressive, and intensive systems of
subsistence agriculture that supported some variants of plantation agriculture;
and the traditional, free  and extensive systems of subsistence agriculture
that supported mostly free systems of smallholder cultivation of cash crops.
The last of these systems is completely absent from the dualist view of a 
rational, export-oriented sector and an irrational, subsistence-oriented sector. 
Recognition of this indigenous, rational, and Janus-faced sector would have 
deprived the colonial government of any ostensible motive for its agricultural 
policy other than its own self-interest.
VI. Application and Testing of the Theory in Contemporary Indonesia
The contemporary Indonesian government's view of agriculture, as discussed at 
the beginning of this article, is a legacy from the colonial and precolonial eras. 
It is a legacy, not in the sense of being a cultural survival or artifact, but 
in the sense of supporting the political economy of the contemporary government 
just as similar views supported the political economies of historic governments. 
The fact that the type of agriculture favored by the government does provide 
such support is documented by data on the distribution of the federal tax burden. 
Anne Booth has written: "In 1974, 44 percent of total revenues were still coming 
from smallholder agricultural land in Java," meaning from intensively cultivated, 
mostly irrigated land; despite the fact that, as she goes on to say, this is 
"undoubtedly the poorest sector of all." In contrast, in the regions of extensive 
agriculture outside of Java, land taxation "is hampered by lack of adequate data 
on land area, class, and ownership," as well as by "widespread evasion."** 945
94. Geertz, Agricultural Involution, pp. 61-62.
95. Anne Booth, "The Role of Agricultural Taxation," in Agricultural and 
Rural Development in Indonesia, ed. Gary E. Hansen (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1981), pp. 48, 49-50.
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The present article 's proposition, that government policy is strongly 
influenced by this varying susceptibility to extraction between intensive 
and extensive systems of agriculture, can be examined by applying it to the 
explication of several otherwise problematic aspects of that policy: namely, 
plantation development, commercial forestry development, and the socioeconomic 
development of tribal peoples. In each case, the actual (as opposed to intended) 
consequences of government policy will be evaluated in terms of their contribution 
to state extraction.
1. Plantation Development
Export crops are an important aspect of the government's program of agricul­
tural development and intensification in the Outer Islands. The government's hope 
is that an increase in foreign exchange from this sector can eventually replace 
some of the anticipated decline in foreign exchange from mineral exports.** 
Historically, the greatest successes in export-crop production have been achieved 
by smallholders whose subsistence food needs were met by swidden cultivation, 
as discussed earlier. However, very few of the government's current efforts 
to develop export-crop production are designed to develop this traditional 
smallholder sector; and other of its efforts, fo r example intensification 
of subsistence food-crop production, are likely to reduce the activities of 
this sector, as also discussed earlier.
Government efforts to develop estate crops are likely to be weakened by some 
of the same factors that have strengthened the traditional mixed pattern of cash 
cropping and swidden cultivation. For example, under the system of smallholdings 
being developed by the government, it appears likely that the owner-cultivators 
will have to depend largely upon their cash crop for the purchase not only of 
consumer goods but of subsistence foodstuffs as well, because the amounts of land 
set aside in these schemes for food-crop production—given the modest (generally 
extensive) agricultural technologies either available or practical—are too 
limited for a household's needs.*7 If this proves to be the case, the smallholders 
will be dependent on market conditions for all or most of their livelihood, 
which is an inherently unstable basis for a peasant economy and polity.**
The government-sponsored development of large estates is likely to have 
even more serious consequences. The attendant creation of a class of landless, 
plantation wage laborers not only ensures the absence of any motivation towards 
sustained, long-term yield and conservation of resources, it also raises issues 
of socioeconomic equity and is likely to create an even less politically stable 
peasantry. The possibility of politica l destabilization is ironic, because 9678
96. Republik Indonesia, Garis-Garis Besar, pp. 33-34.
97. For example, in an oil palm project being developed near Sanggau, West 
Kalimantan by a government plantation group, smallholder participants are 
being allocated 2 hectares for oil palms and 1.75 hectares for subsistence 
food crops, per household. The latter figure compares with an average of 
44 hectares per household (measured as all land involved in the agricultural 
cycle, including temporarily fallowed land) devoted to subsistence food cropping 
by traditional swidden technologies in an adjacent district of West Kalimantan. 
(Dove, Swidden Agriculture in Indonesia.)
98. Pelzer, "Swidden Cultivation in Southeast Asia"; James C. Scott, The 
Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976).
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a purported concern for po litica l stability— especially in provinces with 
international borders—is one of the principal justifications for the government's 
involvement in smallholder and plantation development.
A final question concerns the economics of the government-sponsored small­
holdings and estates. They are certain to be more productive per unit of 
land than the traditional smallholdings, but it is not certain that they will 
be more profitable, due to their much greater capitalization. This has been 
a factor in, for example, the general lack of success of rubber plantations 
in Java, and the continued success, at their expense, of traditional smallholdings 
in the Outer Islands.** I f  minimal capitalization continues to carry this 
competitive edge, the economic success of the government-sponsored smallholdings 
and estates will be in doubt.
In summary, government efforts to develop export-crop production may weaken 
the economy of the traditional smallholder, they may politically destabilize 
the peasantry, and they may not even be profitable. Why then are they being 
carried out? Or more specifically, why are these efforts not being devoted 
instead to the proven combination of traditional export-crop production and 
extensive food-crop production? Government officials give no clear answer 
to this question. Many officials are critical of the low yields—when reckoned 
per unit of area—in traditional smallholder cultivation; almost all are suspicious 
and uncomprehending of swidden cultivation; and very few understand the pervasive 
association in Indonesia between smallholder cash cropping and swidden food 
cropping. According to the thesis of this article, this misperception of 
rea lity  is best explained in terms of the political and economic priorities 
of those doing the misperceiving, namely the government. It seems clear that 
the priorities of the central government are being promoted in its development 
of modern smallholdings and estates. Its ability to control production and 
the fruits of production on these smallholdings and estates—which are developed 
and managed by semi-independent, government plantation groups—is much greater 
than its ability to control the privately owned and sporadically worked traditional 
smallholdings. This is why the government does not "see" either the past 
success of the traditional system or the potential future problems of its 
chosen, new system.
Geertz predicted this continuing extension of Inner Island control to 
the traditional smallholder crops of the Outer Islands.9 100 He saw it as an 
attempt to maintain the standard of living on Java, and as one further stage 
in the island's agricultural involution. My analysis is in agreement with 
Geertz’s insofar as the effect of this extension is concerned (viz., the effect 
of the extension of Inner Island control to the smallholder crops of the Outer 
Islands may indeed be economically involuting), but not with respect to its 
cause. One of the weaknesses of Geertz's analysis is that he is throughout 
less than clear as to the motivation for this process of involution. The 
current analysis suggests that the central government's interest in surplus 
extraction is the primary motivating factor (although other interests, such 
as supporting transmigration projects—which are increasingly being linked 
with plantation projects—may also be involved).101
99. E. H. G. Dobby, Southeast Asia (London: University of London Press, 1973), 
p. 242.
100. Geertz, Agricultural Involution, p. 148.
101. It is revealing to apply this analysis to other areas of agricultural
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2. Forestry Development
As noted earlier, officially sanctioned uses of the national forests include 
watershed management, nature conservation, and especially commercial forestry, 
but not swidden agriculture—which is perceived as too wasteful and destructive 
a use of the forest. It is revealing to consider how wasteful swidden agriculture 
actually is, compared with commercial timber production.1** In terms of returns 
per unit of area, swidden agriculture is indeed less profitable than commercial 
forestry. The earlier-mentioned Kantu’ of Kalimantan can take the equivalent 
of $258 in crops out of one hectare of forest, using swidden agricultural 
techniques, over every ten-year period.10* That same hectare of forest, under 
sustained yield commercial forestry management, can yield the equivalent of 
$1,054 in wood products over every ten-year period—or four times as much as 
under swidden exploitation. However, gross yield is only one way of comparing 
the two alternative systems of exploitation. Arguably more revealing is the 
population-carrying capacity under each system, which turns out to be much higher 
under swidden agriculture than under commercial forest exploitation. One square 
kilometer of forest will support approximately twenty-three Kantu* under the 
former but a maximum of only nine to ten employees under the latter system, due 
to the fact that the standard of living and consumption patterns of logging 
company employees are much higher than those of swidden agriculturalists.
This comparison is made on the most favorable possible terms with respect to 
commercial forest exploitation. In particular, it assumes that this exploitation 
is being carried out on a sustainable basis. In fact, some of the commercial 
forestry in Indonesia is not sustainable at all, because of the use of logging 
techniques that destroy both the ground and the ground cover, the removal 
of too many trees, and the failure to replant.104 Just as important as the
policy as well, for example the current program to intensify irrigated rice 
cultivation on Java. Much ado has been made about the "unexpected** impact 
of the Green Revolution on rural labor relations in Java. The analysis in 
this article suggests that this impact is a predictable step in the ongoing, 
state-controlled development of Javanese agriculture, the result of which 
has always been to facilitate even greater extraction by the state. It is 
now apparent that the Green Revolution has not raised outputs per unit of 
area in Java's irrigated fields so much as it has reduced labor inputs. (William 
L. Collier, "Food Problems, Unemployment and the Green Revolution in Rural 
Java," Prisma 9 (1978): 38-52; White, "Production and Reproduction," pp. 142-43; 
Dibyo Prabowo and Sajogyo, "Sidoarjo, East Java, and Subang, West Java," in 
Agricultural and Rural Development, ed. Hansen, p. 78.) Thus, a major effect 
of the introduction of this technology has been to displace labor in rural 
Java, excluding more people from the agricultural cycle and concentrating 
its product in the hands of fewer and fewer people. This concentration probably 
accounts for some of the "surpluses" being claimed for this technology. That 
is, at least a part of these purported surpluses may represent an increase 
not in production but in extraction. Such an increase would be in accord 
with the increase in urban and government control that has been associated 
with the introduction of this technology (Hainsworth, "Beyond Dualism?" pp. 15-16).
102. See Dove, "Theories of Swidden Agriculture."
103. The yields of both swidden agriculture and commercial forestry are measured 
in terms of constant 1981 dollars, and both are gross measures of yield.
104. Willem Meijer, "Lowland Forestry Management," in Agricultural and Rural
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commercial loggers' direct impact on the forest is their indirect impact, 
especially through the construction of logging roads. As noted early in this 
article, these roads are utilized by lowland truck farmers to enter the partially 
logged forest, cut it, burn it, plant two to four years of cash crops, and 
then move on when the land has been exhausted and degraded.
This overestimation of the productivity of commercial forestry, the under­
estimation of its ill effects, and the frequent absence of critical evaluations 
of the way it is carried out, coupled with the constant suspicion and criticism 
of the tribal fo rest dwellers' system of swidden agriculture, all reflect 
the single most crucial difference between the two systems of resource use: 
the central government can control and exploit the system of commercial forestry 
but not that of swidden agriculture.
3. Socioeconomic Development
A final area of government policy towards the people of the Outer Islands, 
which can be illuminated by the thesis presented here, pertains to the social 
and economic institutions of the Outer Islanders. Government policy is influenced 
by marked anxieties and criticisms regarding these institutions. One example 
is the uniformly negative view of ceremonial expenditure (for eating, drinking, 
and sacrifice) among the tribal peoples of the Outer Islands. This reaction 
is manifested not only personally but also officially, as in a 1976 edict by 
the governor of West Kalimantan that all Dayak longhouses hold their postharvest 
ceremonies on the same day, so as to discourage interlonghouse attendance 
and thereby minimize overall ceremonial expenditure and consumption. This 
attempt to constrict ceremonial expenditure in the Outer Islands cannot be 
explained by cultural differences, since expenditure of this sort is just 
as high—indeed typically much higher—among the dominant cultures of the 
Inner Islands. For example, in 1983 in the Central Javanese city of Yogyakarta, 
Carol Carpenter calculated that the average cost of a selamatan "ceremony" 
to safeguard the welfare of an infant or child was equal to approximately 
$145, and the average cost of a wedding was equal to approximately $1,000, 
the bride's makeup alone costing $100 or more.10* In comparison, during 1974-76 
the cost of one major Kantu’ ceremony, the one staged during the rice planting, 
was the equivalent of less than $6 per field, the cost of the postharvest 
ceremony that the governor sought to constrain averaged $16 per household, 
and the cost of the average wedding was perhaps $25.
Government offic ia ls justify their criticisms of ceremonial expenditures 
in terms of purportedly more productive, alternative uses of the expended 
resources. The one alternative use that is nearly uniformly cited is capital 
investment, such as purchase of a rice huller, chemical fertilizers, or live­
stock—with the justification that such an investment would "improve the economy" 
of the family and/or village involved. This proposition is based on a false 
perception of this ceremonial expenditure as evidence of a subsistence surplus, *105
Development, ed. Hansen, pp. 295-306; Zoefri Hamzah, "Some Observations on 
the Effects of Mechanical Logging on Regeneration, Soil and Hydrological Conditions 
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Forest at Beloro, East Kalimantan," in ibid., pp. 91-96.
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which can and should be diverted from one sort of use (ritual and "wasteful" 
consumption) to another sort (capital investment). In fact, what is expended 
in these ceremonies usually does not represent a surplus, and its expenditure 
typically is a sort of capital investment; but the capital in this case is labor, 
which is the scarce, constraining resource in extensive systems of agriculture 
such as are found in the Outer Islands. 1#‘  These ceremonies tie different 
households and different villages together, and thereby guarantee each one the 
labor of the others—through both reciprocal and wage labor arrangements—during 
periods of labor/work imbalance. This guarantee is one of the principal functions 
of ceremonial feasting.
JJven if the government comprehended this purpose—which it does not—it 
is not clear that its critical stance would be greatly altered; because ceremonial 
expenditure represents a horizontal movement of resources (food, drink, and 
swidden labor), whereas the government is more interested in vertical movement. 
This interest is evident from the nature of the alternative, proposed capital 
expenditures, all of which would involve some movement of resources out of 
the villages and into the national and international markets, in which the 
government and individual government officials have roles as both supervisors 
and economic players.
An even clearer example of the government's self-interest in this regard 
involves its criticism of supposed "primitive communalism" in the Outer Islands. 
This criticism is pronounced in areas where the traditional pattern of settle­
ment—such as the Dayak longhouse in Kalimantan—lends superficial credence 
to this perception of tribal society. O fficial government policy in such 
areas is to discourage or forbid the building of new longhouses and encourage 
or insist upon the dismantling of extant ones, to be replaced by discrete, 
single-family homes. In most of these cases, however, the government’s perception 
diverges greatly from the socioeconomic reality. The Dayak longhouse, for 
example, is in fact a series of adjacent but independently built and owned 
household apartments, inhabited by an exceedingly independent and individualistic 
people, with a highly developed sense of private property and entrepreneurship.106 07
How is the government's misconstrual of this reality, again, to be explained? 
Government officials say they worry that this purported communalism will rob 
the energetic few of any incentive to excel, since they must share the fruits 
of their labors with the less energetic majority. This perceived threat of 
sharing is the key to the government's attitude. Looked at structurally, 
in the light of this article's thesis, such sharing represents, again, a horizontal 
flow of resources, of "surplus" production; whereas the government is only 
interested (or more interested) in a vertical flow—meaning a flow up and 
out of the village economy—that ultimately will reach and sustain the central 
government.
The government's evaluation of these societies as communal is in error, 
but its implied evaluation of their resistance to a vertical flow of surplus 
production is not. The democratic (not communal) character of these societies 
does not rob their members of the economic incentive to surplus production, 
but it does give those who have succeeded in producing a surplus the incentive 
to share it (typically on a reciprocal, loan, or sale, but not gift basis) 
with those who have not succeeded. The incentive to do so is the assurance
106. Dove, "Chayanov Slope in a Swidden Economy."
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that others will do the same when the tables are turned. This system of social 
security shields all members of the society from total economic failure and 
starvation, and, as a result, there is less surplus production flowing out 
of the society than if some of its members were allowed to starve. It is 
thus not social disincentives and underproduction that threaten the government's 
economic plans, but rather local distribution and consumption, and the social 
security that this achieves. The self-interest in perceiving this as communalism 
is also suggested by the prevalence of this same perception among the apologists 
for the old colonial order. For Boeke, for example, a major characteristic 
of the irrational, autochthonous Indonesian economy was its communality.10 •
This latent anxiety over local distribution and consumption is directly 
reflected in government policy to alter extant sociopolitical structures in 
the Outer Islands. As implied in the preceding discussion, many of the tribal 
societies in the Outer Islands are relatively unstratified and egalitarian 
in character, having no castes, classes, or ranks, and few if any indigenous 
leaders. Since the colonial era, one objective of the central government 
has been to strengthen any existing positions of authority in these societies, 
as well as to create new ones, all with the intent of integrating these societies 
into the nationwide hierarchy of government administration. As the result 
of efforts by first the colonial, and then the national, government, the tribal 
Kantu', for example, have the offices of Repaid Kampung and Kebayan to deal 
with intralonghouse matters, Kepala Desa and Patih to deal with interlonghouse 
matters, and Temenggung and Panglima Adat to deal with broader issues of government 
and law— all of these offices introduced in this century. Similar efforts 
are still continuing in the Outer Islands, as in the resettlements for "isolated 
tribes," in all of which a major effort is made to establish a hierarchical 
village administration.
The purported purpose in extending the network of government officers into 
these societies is to fa c ilita te  government administration, including the 
extension of government services. The fact that this is not the only (or even 
the most important) purpose of this effort is evident from the nature of the 
criticism of its results. A common criticism of the newly elevated class of 
Outer Indonesia village leaders, according to central government officials, is 
that they cannot "speak for" their constituencies, in the sense that they alone 
cannot commit their people to a given course of action. To illustrate, several 
years ago the government decided to establish an oil palm plantation on the lower 
Kapuas river in West Kalimantan. Shortly thereafter the plantation management 
flew the local Panglima Adat to their headquarters on Sumatra, and eventually 
obtained his approval of their plans. Subsequently, however, many members 
of his tribe refused either to give or to sell their land to the plantation, 
considerably obstructing its development. The plantation management concluded 
that the Panglima Adat had lied to them. In fact, he had done everything 
within his power to persuade the local population to accept the plantation, 
but the reality of these egalitarian tribal societies is that no man can commit 
or oblige another to do something that he does not want to do. This reality 
ultimately forced the plantation to deal with each tribal member and land 
holder in the region, thereby spending much more time and money than it had 
originally hoped to do by dealing with the Panglima Adat alone. In general, 
extraction by a central authority is frustrated by a nonhierarchical sociopolitical 
organization and facilitated by a hierarchical one. 108
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The government’s support for hierarchical organization is in accord with 
the traditions of Java, whose former kings conceived of themselves as drawing 
mystical power from their subjects, at the apex of whom they stood. *•* The 
analysis in this article shows that the Javanese kings—like the contemporary 
central government—actually drew their power from their subjects in a much 
more prosaic sense: namely, the relations between the rulers and the ruled, 
the top and the bottom, the center and the periphery, were and are arranged 
so that material resources flow up and in, and thereby sustain the central 
polity. A hierarchical sociopolitical structure is crucial to this flow and 
a nonhierarchical structure is antithetical to it, which explains the antipathy 
of past and present central governments to the latter. This antipathy is 
articulated as opposition to communal social structures. In fact, the societies 
involved are typically prim itive democracies; but the label of "primitive 
communism" justifies government intervention in support of surplus extraction, 
whereas the label of "primitive democracy" would not.
VII, Summary, Discussion, and Conclusion
1. Summary
I commenced this article with the proposition that the preeminent culture 
of inner Indonesia, the Javanese, has an illusory view of intensive versus 
extensive systems of agriculture. I discussed one salient product of this view, 
namely the official policy to promote intensive agriculture and prohibit swidden 
agriculture in the Outer Islands of Indonesia. I then analyzed the reality of 
this latter system of agriculture. I argued that, although the central government 
views swidden agriculture as a poor use of land and labor, sustaining only a 
low standard of living, it is in fact a highly rational use of both labor and land, 
and its practitioners are fully integrated into the national and international 
market economies. In contrast, I argued that the intensive agricultural systems, 
which are promoted by the government as making optimal use of land and labor and 
contributing to the highest level of social welfare, actually yield a relatively 
low return on labor and limit opportunities for cash cropping. I sought the 
origins of this paradox—between the official stance and the empirical reality—in 
the rise of the early Javanese kingdoms, when concentration of the population, 
intensification of its agricultural practices, and proscription of forest-based 
alternatives were all essential to state extraction and survival. I traced 
this stance through the colonial era, arguing that the Dutch government was 
also biased in favor of intensive agriculture and against extensive agriculture, 
because of the respective susceptibility and insusceptibility of the systems 
to state extraction. Finally, I argued that, by imputing a similar stance to 
the current national government, otherwise problematic aspects of its development 
policy in the Outer Islands can be explained.
Throughout Indonesia's history, therefore, intensive systems of agriculture 
have given power and profit to successive central governments, whereas extensive 
systems either have given them little or have actually taken from them. The 
prevalent myth in governing circles of the superiority and inferiority of 
intensive and extensive systems of agriculture, respectively, thus can be 
interpreted as a rationale for the control and exploitation of peasant lands 109
109. Anderson, "Idea of Power," p. 22.
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and labor. It is a persevering mythology of oppression. This mythology is 
not held by the peasants, however, whom it does not serve.110
As stated earlier, I regard this myth as an "ideological deflection." 
Following Wallerstein, this is a belief that is deflected from empirical reality 
due to political and economic interest. As Wallerstein implies, this deflection 
is not a conscious process. It seems certain that the successive central 
governments in Indonesia that have held to the aforesaid myth have believed 
in its verity, despite the manifest evidence to the contrary. The colonial 
and postcolonial governments (if not the early Javanese kingdoms as well) 
have maintained that their beliefs regarding the economy and ecology of peasant 
agriculture are founded on a concern for the welfare of the peoples involved; 
but as discussed earlier, this welfare is in fact not enhanced by these beliefs 
and the ensuing policies. Thus, not only is the deflection unconscious, its 
function or effect is latent and unrecognized.
Evidence of this latency is contained in the current central government's 
efforts to resettle and develop swidden agriculturalists, and in its reaction 
to the widespread failure of these efforts. Since it justifies these programs 
in terms of their favorable impact on the extant, purportedly low standard 
of living of the swidden agriculturalists, it can explain their failure only 
in terms of the "backwardness" or "strength of traditions" of these people 
(or, more recently, in terms of the inadequacies of the government offices 
and officers involved). It cannot explain their failure in terms of the greater 
economic attractions of swidden agriculture. That would involve acknowledging 
that the government pressure to proscribe or intensify this system of cultivation 
is motivated not out of interest for the welfare of its practitioners, but 
out of self-interest. The economic interests that would not be served by 
such an acknowledgement prevent it being made. This is why the government 
continues to build resettlement villages and develop intensive agricultural 
systems for Outer Island swidden cultivators, and why it continues to be genuinely 
surprised whenever they are rejected. The gap between the manifest and latent 
justifications for such government programs, on the one hand, and, on the 
other, between the actual and official explanation for their failure, is one 
important reason why, as Anderson has said,111 12relations between inner and 
outer Indonesia are governed not only by economics but also by ideology.
2. Theoretical Significance
One of the most important conclusions to be drawn from this analysis is its 
support for Boserup's theory that population growth, or population concentration 
and control, precedes agricultural development and intensification, and not 
the reverse—the reverse being the Malthusian theory.11* In the Indonesian 
case study discussed in this article, the development of swidden-rice cultivation 
into irrigated-rice cultivation was due less to the latter's attraction to 
its peasant practitioners than to its attraction to successive central governments 
intent on extracting a portion of the agricultural product. Swidden agriculture 
was less attractive to these governments because it is less susceptible to 
such extraction and because it lures peasants away from the more intensive 
systems that are susceptible. On the other hand, both because of this lesser
110. Cf. Wallerstein, Modern World-System I , p. 4.
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susceptibility and because of its inherent tendency to produce higher yields 
per unit of labor, swidden agriculture is usually more attractive to the peasants 
themselves. In this context of opposing interests and agricultural systems, 
the replacement of swidden-rice cultivation by irrigated-rice cultivation 
was due less to the desires of the peasants than to those of their central 
governments, as manifested in programs to concentrate the farming population 
and coerce them to practice intensive agriculture. Boserup's theory thus 
addresses, directly, what is otherwise seen as one of the major weaknesses 
of the nNeo-Malthusianistsn or population determinists: namely, it looks not 
just at the effects of population growth/concentration but also at its causes, 
relating these to the interests of the broader social formations in which 
the peasant agricultural society is set. In many studies of agricultural 
development, population growth is cited as an explanatory variable but is 
not related to the other major explanatory variable, namely state policy and 
interests.11* The failure to do so has been rightly criticized.114
This analysis suggests reversing the emphasis of the questions typically 
posed about agricultural development and state formation. Instead of asking 
whether swidden agriculture can support state formation, it may be more important 
to ask why states tend to constrain systems of swidden agriculture. Similarly, 
instead of asking how systems of irrigated agriculture stimulate state formation, 
it may be more important to ask why states tend to force their development. The 
results of this analysis are in accord with more recent studies of irrigation,11* 
which generally dispute the Wittfogelian thesis that dependence on irrigation 
typically leads to the development of despotic, hydraulic states.114
This reexamination of the causal directions of agricultural development 
demonstrates the futility of trying to explain this development as a pure 
exercise in agronomy, and the necessity of relating it to the broader ecological, 
demographic, and, especially, economic and political context. This necessitates 
looking at agricultural development not as a value-free process, but as a 
process carried out by and for specific actors—whether these be governments 
or peasants. This actor-centered approach illuminates the distinction, in 
agriculture and agricultural development, between returns to land and returns 
to labor. The latter tend to be maximized by landless laborers and landowning 
workers, while the former are maximized by nonworking landowners and extracting 
governments. This difference is due to a basic difference in purpose. As 
Hainsworth has written, raising the standard of living of the peasantry is 
not the same as maximizing total output or mobilizable surplus;11’  nor are 
the two attained by the same means. The emphasis of the contemporary Indonesian 
government is reflected in the recently published and officially sanctioned
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"rice bible" for Indonesia,11* which presents a wealth of data on Indonesian 
rice yields per hectare but none on rice yields per man day (nor on man-day 
inputs). The analysis in this article shows that this focus on returns to 
land is neither natural, necessary, nor objective. Rather, it is merely one 
possible focus, chosen because it supports a particular, partisan view of 
the means of agricultural production and the control and exploitation thereof.
The government's emphasis on returns to land is also evident in its earlier 
cited, oft repeated criticism of swidden agriculture: namely, however adaptive 
it may be at the present time, it is ultimately maladaptive, because it cannot 
absorb continual increases in population density. A system of agriculture 
that can absorb such increases, such as irrigated rice cultivation, produces 
a greater and greater total product per unit of area but not per unit of labor. 
Indeed, the product per unit of labor tends to decline as the product per 
unit of area increases.11* The absence of this characteristic in systems 
of swidden agriculture is deemed a failing because of the government's partisan 
view of agricultural development. There is nothing in Indonesia's agricultural 
history to suggest that an emphasis on labor absorption as opposed to labor 
productivity is the solution to its economic and demographic difficulties, 
and there is everything to suggest that it is in fact part of the problem.110
Throughout this analysis the economic constraints and capacities of swidden 
agriculture have been treated as important explanatory variables. Some scholars 
have questioned the appropriateness of cultural-materialist analyses of extensive 
systems of agriculture because, they say, such systems are based largely on 
household relations as opposed to broader, sociopolitical relations.111 Even 
if we grant that the agricultural ecology and economy of a system of extensive 
agriculture are not vital to the dynamics of sociopolitical relations within 
that society or to the understanding thereof—which is a problematic stance 
but beyond the scope of this article—the present analysis has shown that 
they nonetheless may be critical to the dynamics and understanding of the 
place of that society within broader, regional, sociopolitical relationships. 
Indeed, the Indonesian case study shows that the ability of a population to 
practice extensive agriculture can become a major shaping and constraining 
factor in state formation.
This emphasis on political economy is not a denigration of the importance 
of ecological factors, which are the most crucial constraining factors of all. 
(Boserup is perhaps overzealous in negating such factors in her analysis of the 
role of population.)111 The climate, hydrology, and in particular the geology of 
Java are clearly the principal reasons why agrarian kingdoms flourished there 
as opposed, for example, to Kalimantan, with its much older and nutrient-poor 
geology. While a particular ecology may be necessary for the development of 
intensive agricultural systems, however, it is not sufficient. This is the
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final lesson to be learned from the application of Boserup's theory in this 
article. Agricultural intensification is neither a natural nor an inevitable 
development in those environments that nonetheless make it possible. In the 
absence of a central government it may not occur, and in the presence of a 
central government it may be resisted. The converse also holds true: given 
pressure from a central government, agricultural intensification may take 
place in a natural environment that is ill suited to it. This applies to the 
government's current program of agricultural intensification in various parts 
of the Outer Islands, where attempts to develop irrigated rice cultivation must 
contend with poor soils and problematic hydrology. The very fact that the 
government is pressing for agricultural intensification in these areas demonstrates 
that such intensification can be more than a simple response to a favorable 
environment; just as the historic practice of swidden agriculture in Java, by 
refugees from its hydraulic kingdoms, demonstrates that the extensification 
of agriculture is not simply a response to a less favorable environment.
3. Policy Recommendations
This analysis yields several conclusions of relevance for development 
planning in Indonesia's Outer Islands. One conclusion is that much swidden 
agriculture represents the optimal use of the land and labor of its practitioners, 
viewed from their own perspective. Accordingly, the current national government 
might be advised to cease its attempts to proscribe all swidden agriculture— 
limiting these attempts to its destructive variants—and devote its resources 
rather to the improvement of this system of agriculture, perhaps through breeding 
programs for swidden cultigens, through the introduction of new species and/or 
techniques to quicken reforestation on newly fallowed swidden plots, and so 
on. The government might embrace these recommendations if its sole goal were 
to improve the economic conditions of the swidden agriculturalists. As discussed 
in this article, however, one important, if latent, goal of the government 
is to improve the economic conditions of those people and enterprises most 
proximate to it. This goal is not served by the continued practice of swidden 
agriculture, and so it may be futile to urge or expect the government to commit 
itself to developing—as opposed to eradicating—swidden agriculture,
A second recommendation, that the government develop smallholder export-crop 
production, is likely to encounter some, but not all, of the above problems. 
One point in its favor is that, while the system of swidden agriculture directly 
benefits only its practitioners, the associated systems of cash cropping benefit 
not only the smallholders themselves but the nation as a whole, through their 
contribution to foreign exchange. Accordingly, it may be worth while to recommend 
to the government that it not devote all of its resources to expensive, large-scale 
plantation development schemes, involving resettlement and transmigration 
as well, but devote at least some to the far cheaper, in situ improvement 
of extant smallholder production, through, for example, the provision of improved 
stock and some simple extension services. (In the context of such development, 
it might be possible to direct some positive attention to swidden agriculture 
as well, since the fact that it supports and sustains smallholder cash cropping 
is the only point in its favor that is likely to be recognized by government 
policy makers.) Even in this case, however, current developments suggest 
that the long-term interests of the many—in having a reliable and broad-based 
system of export-crop production by smallholders—may lose out to the short-term 
interests of the few—in having a less broad-based and more volatile but profitable 
system of export-crop production in plantations.
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While the short-term interests of policy makers may be supported by extant 
policy, their own long-term interests are not. As noted earlier, the current 
policy of denying rights of ownership and use of natural resources to local 
populations, and appropriating them to the national government and its private 
and semiprivate concessionaires, often results in the exploitation of these 
resources for the maximum profit in the minimum amount of time. This leaves 
little  or nothing for the future, including the future of the government officials 
and contractors. Similarly, a number of current government programs—including 
resettlement, transmigration, and plantation development—are likely to radicalize 
some of the peasantries involved. This radicalization, while caused by the 
short-term economic and political interests of the central government, is likely 
to jeopardize directly these very same interests in the middle to long term.
It is difficult to explain such jeopardization of long-term self-interest 
as other than an inherent weakness of overly centralized political and economic 
power. The antidote is to change policy and place greater emphasis on the 
self-interest and welfare of the peasantry. The potential for such change 
is constrained, however, by the fact that the goal of this proposed policy 
is already the manifest goal of the present policy. The latent goals, however, 
are very different, and the essence of the problem in changing these is precisely 
that they are latent.
